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Abstract

Role of Influence in Complex Networks
by
Nur Dean

Advisor: Shweta Jain

Game theory is a wide ranging research area; that has attracted researchers from various
fields. Scientists have been using game theory to understand the evolution of cooperation
in complex networks. However, there is limited research that considers the structure and
connectivity patterns in networks, which create heterogeneity among nodes. For example,
due to the complex ways most networks are formed, it is common to have some highly
“social” nodes, while others are highly isolated. This heterogeneity is measured through
metrics referred to as “centrality” of nodes. Thus, the more “social” nodes tend to also
have higher centrality.

In this thesis, two 2-player games are used to understand properties of several types
of graph structures. In particular, how information would travel if people had the tendency to follow friends/connections with higher influences than themselves. Simulation
framework is created and experiments are done with Stag Hunt and Hawk Dove games

v
in Torus, Grid, Random, Watts Strogatz, Bárabasi-Albert, and a Facebook friendship
datasets. The game is played in multiple rounds or until the steady state is reached.
After each round, each player may independently decide to change their strategy. This
change in strategy is determined using best response dynamics, given the player’s payoff
relative to their neighbors, in the previous round. This is also known as evolutionary
dynamics or diffusion. In this thesis, a new method is introduced in which players use a
Fermi like function to use relative centrality as a factor in choosing their strategy for the
subsequent round of the game. This model considers the centrality of each node related
to the whole population. Evolution of strategies under various measures of centrality is
observed. This approach helps us understand how information flows through the network
when nodes in the network are “influenced” by their neighbors’ centrality (and hence
power) in the network.

By comparing these two strategy update rules, some similarities as well as differences,
in relation to the speed of convergence, the point of convergence, and the final steady
state is encountered . In some networks, in order to reach a steady state in the Stag Hunt
game with centrality based rule, more Stags are necessary for the stags to dominate the
network at steady state. It was also very apparent that centrality is affecting the time
it takes to reach steady state. This is a sign of how some centrality measures affect the
dynamics of the whole population. These results have allowed us to delve deeply into
understanding the social impact of decision making and what occurs as a direct result of

vi
that social impact on a population thereafter.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Networks are ubiquitous in the modern society with most entities in our world organized
as networks. Vertices and edges can be used to model a large variety systems which is
seen around us such as the transportation network, the electric grid, roads, the Internet
and social networks. In global networks such as air-travel, Internet and Social networks,
local phenomenon can slowly reach far off places. For example, a wild fire that starts
in one part of California ends up spreading to other regions. The Arab uprising of
2010 is another example, where a demonstration against the oppressive government that
started in Tunisia, spread to five other nearby countries that had similar problems, Libya,
Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. The most recent example is the COVID 19 virus that
started at one end of the globe and slowly reached almost all countries. In a networked
world, the spread of events is inevitable. Therefore, studying the propagation of events or
information is both interesting and important to develop an understanding of how events
in one regions reach or affect the rest of the network.

1
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Analyzing networks has been of interest to scientists for several decades but more
recently scientists have started looking at network structures that exist in real life rather
than considering networks as a random organization of vertices and edges. When this
transition was made at the turn of the 21st century, scientists found many interesting
features which explained the size degree of separation phenomenon that was studied
decades ago by Milgram [21]. This research, often referred to as network science can span
across many disciplines such as Social and Political Sciences, Economics, Mathematics
and Computer Science.

Recently, social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are widely used
for communication, sharing opinions, and market products. These platforms are very
useful in analyzing and studying the relationship between individuals and groups. Social
networks are also graph structures whose vertices represent people or other entities embedded in a social context and their edges represent friendships, interactions, collaboration,
and influence between entities [19]. Spread of information then depends on popularity
of the individual. Opinions can be shaped because of influence of individuals on their
connections and followers. In this thesis, the propagation of information in networks
studied through a study of two player games played repeatedly. Experiments are done
with various types of networks such as regular, random and complex networks. Goal of
this thesis to study the propagation of choices across the network and to understand how
the network structure affects the composition of the network in steady state. The game
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is designed with a percentage of players initially choosing a strategy. Then players play
against their neighbors and evaluate their utility in comparison to their neighbors. Based
on the relative payoffs, players decide the strategy they would play in the next round.
Network composition change is observed as the strategies evolve over several rounds of
the game; until a steady state is reached or it becomes apparent that no steady state
is possible. The main objective in this study is to understand how the structure of the
network affects the final composition of networks. Therefore, while the experiments are
done with pure payoff based utility as the first step, the measure of relative centrality of
nodes as factor in the determining the utility is also considered.

Game Theory captures the mathematical behavior of some strategic situations whereas
individual players choose strategies and their payoff is dependent upon the combination
of their own strategy relative to the strategies of other players. The objective in static
games is to maximize a given utility functions. When a game is considered in a population
that contains two groups, the evolutionary advantage of one group when competing with
the other group is defined as their fitness. In this respect, the relative “fitness” of a
population group over the other determines the proportions of each population group
in steady state. For example, in a population of large and small beetles, with a finite
supply of food, the fitness of each beetle will decide whether one would exist at a steady
state [3]. It is possible for one population to completely perish eventually or one group
dominates the other. Another objective in an evolutionary game theory based study is
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to evaluate cooperation among a population group. In any case, the process of evolution
in evolutionary game theory depends on the fitness of each population group and it
can be modeled as one of the many game dynamics such as replicator dynamics, best
response dynamics, imitation dynamics, the Brown–Von Neumann–Nash dynamics and
several others. Later in Chapter 2, an overview of different evolutionary game dynamics is
presented. The model that is used in this thesis is presented to understand the evolution
of strategies in various networks in Chapter 3. Then in Chapter 4, a simulation framework
that is used to evaluate various two player games played on different networks ranging
from regular grid to complex networks in order to analyze the emergence of cooperation
is presented. In Chapter 5 results using the best response dynamics is given. In Chapter
6, the results for the Fermi-like rule which is designed as a strategy update rule that
incorporates influence/centrality of nodes in the network with the payoff of players is
given. Finally, in Chapter 7 comparison of two strategies for both games, the conclusion
and future work.

Chapter 2
Background
Game Theory officially originated by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern with
a masterpiece book which is written on a classical Game Theory ”Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior” [36]. Systematic theory of games introduced for the first time
with this book. However, actual emergence of Game Theory originated in 1920s when
Von Neumann wanted to develop scientific approach how to bluff in poker game. Von
Neumann was a genius, but he was a mediocre poker player, and quickly realized that
probability theory could not help anyone to win poker games. Neumann has formulated
how poker players can bluff by playing a series of strategies to deceive their opponents,
hide information and eventually win the game. In the early 1950s Von Neumann became
an enlightening intellectual in the United States. However, John Nash, who described
and proved Nash Equilibrium in this thesis, lessened Neumann’s contribution in the eyes
of the public.

5
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In this chapter, the basic definitions and requirements for Game Theory will be introduced before get into the details of Game Theory and evolutionary Game Theory.
Basic ingredients of a game are;
• Players : A player is a decision make in a game. Player can be an individual,
government or even be an animal.
• Strategies: Strategy is a possible action of a player chosen from planned options.
• Payoffs : Payoff is a number or utility based on the strategies used by players.
Payoffs are weighted with probabilities when the outcomes are random.
Rationality: The general assumption in Game Theory is that all players are rational.
Each player chooses a strategy to maximize their payoff in consideration of the other
player’s strategies. First idea with rationality is to maximize the payoff, second is to pick
optimal strategy.
Now that a deeper understanding of game theory and it’s basic definitions are introduced,
it is more clear now to explain the recent research models and results that inspired this
thesis in the following sections.

2.1

Results from Evolutionary Game Theory

John Maynard Smith and G.R. Price introduced the Evolutionary Game Theory with
a paper published in Nature in 1973. Since then Evolutionary Game Theory has been
applied most widely in the area of evolutionary biology. Smith and Price developed the
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concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), which is an unbeatable strategy. Individuals in a population who adopt this strategy eventually outnumber their competitors.
Thus, the domination of individuals with a more rare feature is inhibited by Natural Selection, providing a balance between the cooperators and defectors. This natural (scientific)
truth is in perfect harmony with Nash Equilibrium. On this count, Evolutionary Game
Theory was born with these first steps. Unlike economic or mathematical Game Theory,
Evolutionary Game Theory examines the dynamic (movements and variability) of game
strategies, rather than examining strategies of equilibrium maintenance and preservation.
ESS based reasoning continued to develop by John Maynard Smith and he wrote “Evolution and the Theory of Games” [31] in 1982. In this book, Game Theory was used
to analyze economic behavior and adapted to the context of biological natural selection.
In 1984, Robert Axelrod explores the benefits of cooperative strategies in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma in his book “The Evolution of Cooperation” [22]. According to Axelrod, mutuality is essential for real-life cooperation. Thus, players who take into account
their future interests will ultimately seek to increase cooperation and even take prevention
against behaviors that disrupt co-operation.

Evolutionary game theorists have used models of networks to study the evolution of
cooperation in two player games. Until 1992, evolutionary game theorists considered
unstructured (well mixed) population where individuals could interact with any randomly
chosen individuals. Nowak and May [25] presented an influential work on games that
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are played on networks i.e., when interactions are restricted within a spatial structure.
Thus players were placed on two dimensional spatial array and interactions are between
players that are immediate neighbors. After each round, each site was occupied by the
offspring/replica of the winning neighbor. The rule for this process (replicator dynamics)
depended on the pair-wise payoffs that are apriori known to all. Nowak and May use
Prisoner’s Dilemma where each player has two options, cooperate (C) and defect (D);
both players cooperate then both gets 1 point, both defects both gets 0 points, if one
defects and the other cooperates defector gets b points and cooperator gets 0 points.
They discovered that when b is between 2 and 1.8, the network remains in a state of
chaos with the overall proportion of cooperators fluctuating around 0.318 regardless of
the initial proportion at the beginning of the game. Nowak and May observed spatial
chaos and extremely complex behavior when neighbors interact each other, while both
cooperators and defectors remain in the population.

After Nowak and May’s work, this area investigated more by Nowak and May as well
as other scientists. In 1993, Huberman and Glance[13] introduced asynchronous updating
into the Nowak and May model. Instead of updating cells on the lattice synchronously,
individual cell were chosen randomly and the player which occupies that cell replaced
by the highest scoring player in the neighborhood. This lead population to turn into all
defectors rather than having some cooperators survive. They came to the conclusion that
spatial games might be useful for evolution of cooperation in biological communities. In
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1997, Killingback and Doebeli [16] worked on spatial generalizations of the extensions
of the Hawk-Dove game. They used Retaliator and Bully [16] strategies as an extension of Hawk-Dove game and their calculations done on 70 x 70 lattice. In their study,
they discussed about applying randomization to spatial game and comparing it with unrandomized case. When randomization apply to the the spatial game, Hawk strategy
is more successful than in the classical game. On the other hand when randomization
applied to the three strategy game, Retaliator almost wipes out of the population. In the
Hawk-Dove-Retaliator-Bully game unrandomized case is even better for Retaliator since
Retaliators completely take over the population most of the time unlike classical theory
where all strategies survived. They show that the results are qualitatively different from
those obtained from classical evolutionary Game Theory. Thus spatiality added a new
dimension to this study.

Nakamaru et. al (1997) [23] studied the evolution of cooperation of unrelated individuals in a lattice structure. His models examined on one and two dimensional regular
square lattices. Prisoner’s Dilemma game is played with neighbors using tit-for-tat (TFT,
cooperative strategy) and all defector (AD, selfish strategy) on a lattice of size 20 x 20
and 100 x 100. Results were compared with the complete mixing models. They found
that lattices improve cooperation; specifically, TFT can invade an AD population.

There is also evidence which states that spatial structure may not necessarily result
in cooperation. In 2004, Hauert & Doebeli [12] showed there is no such generalization
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that spatial structure promotes the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. Game
played on 100 x 100 regular lattices where individuals collaborate with their neighbors and
the square lattices which they used consist of 4 and 8 neighbors. They used synchronous
and asynchronous updating on the lattice. In their model with snowdrift game, mutual
cooperation pays a net benefit R=b-c/2 and mutual defection results P=0. If there is
a one sided cooperation, defector gets T=b and cooperator gets S=b-c where b is the
benefit and c is the cost and b > c > 0. They discovered that rate of cooperators for a
wide range of parameters reduced in a spatial structure, especially, if the cost-to-benefit
ratio is high, cooperation can be eliminated in a spatial structure.

Only recently, researchers from several fields including physics, mathematics and computer science have started studying evolutionary Game Theory in complex networks [e.g.
Albert and Bárabasi (2002); Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003); Newman (2003); Boccaletti
et al. (2006)]. Games on several networks have been explored by researchers, such as on
regular lattice, scale-free networks and it is started to explored on real social networks at
the beginning of 21st century. Mainly, Prisoner’s Dilemma game became the focus point
of researchers, and there is some work that uses Stag-Hunt, Snowdrift and Dove-Hawk
games.

In 2006, Ohtsuki et al.[27] studied the evolution of cooperation on a large variety of
graphs such as cycle, lattice, random regular graph, random graph and scale-free network.
They used 100 to 500 nodes to generate their networks for simulations. Their simulations,
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based on the Prisoner’s dilemma game, where payoff for cooperation is b-c and payoff for
defection is 0 and with unilateral cooperation, cooperator’s payoff is b while defector’s
payoff is -c, where b is the benefit and c is the cost. They found that natural selection
favors cooperation if b/c > k, where k is the number of neighbors. They discovered that
the rule does have consistent results in several types of regular, random and complex
networks. In a well mixed population, the results were opposite i.e., defectors were found
to dominate.

In 2007, Gomez- Gardenes et al.[9] studied the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma with payoffs R=1, P=S=0 and T=b>1 in Erdös Renyı́ and Scale Free
Networks of 4000 nodes. They simulated three different classes of players; those who
always cooperate, those always defect and those who often change their strategy. They
found that in Scale-Free(SF) networks, pure cooperators always form a single cluster and
in Erdös Renyı́(ER) networks pure cooperators and defector strategies are grouped into
several clusters.

Santos, Pacheco and Lenaerts worked on the evolutionary game dynamics on singlescale and scale-free networks of contacts [28].Their model based on the Stag-Hunt, Snowdrift and Prisoner’s Dilemma games where game payoffs are S for the cooperator and T for
the defector while one player cooperate and the other defects. They normalized mutual
defection to 0 and mutual cooperation to 1 and considered T in the range of 0 ≤ T ≤ 2
and S in the range of −1 ≤ S ≤ 1. Results in a network with 104 nodes for a well mixed
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population show the emergence of cooperation and found that cooperation is better when
the heterogeneity of the network increases.

In 2008, Lozano et al. [20] experimented Prisoner Dilemma game on real networks,
email traffic between members of University Rovira i Virgli and Pretty-Good- Privacy
encryption algorithm (PGP). In their model, cooperation(C) or defection(D) randomly
assigned with the same probability and game is played between each neighbors, not with
all other players. Next round players imitated the most successful player in the neighborhood and payoff set to zero and game played multiple times in the same manner. They
used the following payoff matrix with the condition b > 1 >  > 0
C
D

C
1
b

D
0


Table 2.1: Payoffs received by the row player when plays against the strategy in the
column.
Their results shows that even for small value of b, in both networks, high level of cooperation was achieved, which is more than regular lattices. This result was not enough to
talk about typical behavior of real social networks when PD game played with imitation
dynamics, therefore they further studied using community structure, inter-community
and intra-community. When they used the two mesoscopic structural properties, intracommunity heterogeneity (IH) and inter-community connectivity (IC) they found that
it influences the evolution of cooperation by lowering or raising the cooperation. In return, this shows that cooperation in social networks is complex and depends on structural
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features.

Tomassini, Luthi and Giacobini explored the Hawk-Dove game on regular lattice, and
networks between random and small-world [34] with 2500 players distributed to five different networks. They used three types of rules to update player’s strategy: replicator
dynamics, proportional updating and best-takes over, and they examined synchronous
and asynchronous update in order to have comparison. Another important part of their
simulation was the consideration of gain to cost ratio in their experiments. They discovered that the influence depends on player’s strategy as well as the gain cost ratio r=G/C.
While r set to r > 7/9, isolated doves and dove pairs surrounded by hawks wipe out
from the population independent of the asynchronous or synchronous update policy in
the lattice and small-world. On the other hand dove pairs surrounded by hawks have
more chance to stay alive while isolated doves disappear at r = 7/9.

2.2

Results from Influence Based Strategy Update
Rule

Jiang, Chen and Liu had research on Evolutionary dynamics of information diffusion
using evolutionary game theory [14]. They analyzed dynamic of information process in
three sections, diffusion dynamics over complete networks, uniform degree networks, and
non-uniform degree networks. In complete network, using evolutionary game they modeled information diffusion dynamics. Their model consists of N players with strategies;
Sf : forwarding the received information and xf is the fraction of users who chose strategy
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Sf and Sn :not forwarding the received information and xn is the fraction of users who
chose strategy Sn . Lastly the payoff matrix which is used on their model is given on the
following table.
Sf
Sn

Sf
uf f
uf n

Sn
uf n
unn

Table 2.2: Payoff Matrix which is used on Jiang, Chen and Liu’s research[14]
Passing the information to the other users depends on the payoff, if the player receives
larger payoff he/she choose to pass the information and they have a theorem which gives
the population dynamics.
Theorem 1. The population dynamics of information diffusion over complete networks
can be described as follows:
ẋf (t) = αxf (t)(1 − xf (t))(a1 xf (t) + b1 )
xf (t + 1) = xf (t) + ẋf (t)
where
a1 = uf f − 2uf n + unn
b1 = uf n − unn
ẋf = xf (ψ̄f − ψ)
ẋn = xn (ψ̄f − ψ)
ψ̄f is the average fitness of adopting Sf
In their uniform degree network model, their target is to analyze the information diffusion
using replicator dynamics on the final stable state. Strategy updating rules which are used

CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

15

in their uniform degree network model is based on the work which is done by Ohtsukia and
Nowak [26]; birth-death, death-birth and imitation updating rules. N players considered
on homogeneous graph with degree k where each player has potential connection with
his/her neighbor. Population dynamics, relationship dynamics and influence dynamics are
taken into consideration for information diffusion over graph based network. Each players’
global strategy update analyzed for population dynamics. Influence and relationship
dynamics based on the birth-death update rule for instance, Sn take over the neighbors
strategy Sf if it is chosen for reproduction. They came up with a theorem to formulate
birth-date strategy update.
Theorem 2. The population dynamics of information diffusion over uniform degree networks under Birth-Death strategy update rule can be described as follows:
ẋf (t) =

(k − 2)
xf (t)(1 − xf (t))(a2 xf (t) + b2 )
(k − 1)

xf (t + 1) = xf (t) + ẋf (t)
where
a2 = (k − 2)(uf f − 2uf n + unn )
b2 = uf f + (k − 2)uf n − (k − 1)unn
Lastly, they worked on the diffusion dynamics over non-uniform degree networks, Bárabasi
and Albert and Erdős and Reny̋i. They didn’t pay attention to the degree correlation.
In order to support their theorems, they tested simulations on synthetic and real world
networks, Facebook and Twitter. Four different cases based on different payoffs considered
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in their networks and they were successfully justify the correctness of Theorems which
are listed above. They successfully able to create a graphical evolutionary game theory
framework which is efficient to model the propagation of information.

Yang et. al in 2019 [38] studied the propagation model based on evolutionary game
theory. They used a simple graph with no nodes connected to itself and there are no
parallel edges in the graph. They first analyzed the individuals payoff which the sum of
payoffs between individual’s’ and his/her neighbor. There are 3 states of propagation: I
is ignorant, B1 is the believers of the first piece of information and B2 is the believers
of the second piece of information. Spreading the information in real social networks
depending on the friendship and each friend has different level of ability to spread a piece
of information. Highest payoff neighbour has a higher chance to be selected. Probability
of replicating a neighbor’s strategy is calculated by combining the attention degree with
the payoff difference between an individual and the selected neighbor. Fermi function is
used in order to calculate the probability.
exp(−s2ij ∗ (t)/wij ∗ (t))
pi→j ∗ (t + 1) =
1 + exp[(Ui (t) − Uj ∗ (t))/]
where , sij ∗ the number of times individual i and j ∗ have adopted different strategies
when i receives the information believed by j ∗ before time t
sij ∗ the number of times individual i has received the information that is believed by their
friend j ∗ before time t
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wij ∗ (t) is the number of times times individual i has received the information that is
believed by their friend j ∗ before time t
Ui (t) is the total payoff of individual i at time t
Uj∗ (t) is the total payoff of individual i at time t
 is the environment noise factors, which reflect the individual uncertainty at the time
when strategy updates occur
In their research they used real social networks, Hamsterster, Simmons81, Oberlin44, and
Bowdoin47, to support their analysis. In these networks, after spreading an information
if an individual has higher payoff then that certain information wins the game and the
system become stable.

Latest work which is known is from Ge, Li Li [8]. In their paper they analyzed
the effects of heterogeneity and the centrality measures on another version of BárabasiAlbert Network which is used on Eppstein’s paper[4]. In their experiments they used
2000 nodes and they experimented different values of average degree < k > and the game
which they used is the Prisoner Dilemma with payoff values R=2, P=1, 0 ≤ S ≤ 1 and
2 ≤ T ≤ 3. At the beginning random number of players assigned to cooperation strategy
and synchronous update rule is used. Later in the game individuals change their strategy
with a probability
Psty →st+1
=
x

1
1+e

[(pty −ptx )/k]

where sx and sy are the strategy of the individuals x and y respectively and k is the
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uncertainty which is set to 0.1.
They conclude that when the average degree is equal to 2.7 initial fraction of cooperators
is maximized. One of their main finding is when individuals have more connection they
will tend to cooperate however too little or too much connectivity reduce the cooperation.
Cooperation is observed when medium level of heterogeneity exists. In their works they
used centrality metrics to rank individuals. Individuals who have the highest centrality
assigned as cooperators and centrality is used in order to find the initial cooperators in
the game. They came to the conclusion that Degree, Hindex and Coreness centralities
are more effective to find the players who are marked as cooperators at the beginning of
the game.

2.2.1

Evolutionary Dynamics

The dynamics of evolution in networks has been mathematically represented by researchers. In this section, some of the models that are used to represent and analyze
evolutionary games will be discussed. Then explanation of the payoff based model that
is used in this thesis will be given.
Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics is a fundamental and simple model to understand the evolutionary
dynamics in a population. The name comes from considering a strategy in the game as
replicator and replicators try to copy/replicate themselves in the population. Replicators
interact in order to produce payoffs which is called fitness and replicators imitate their
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neighbors, depending on their fitness relative to the fitness of others in the population.
The replicator strategy is assumed to spread if the payoff for the strategy is higher than
the average.

Let’s consider a large population with N players in a two player game. At each stage,
a player is randomly chosen to play with another player. Players cannot pick their own
strategy so they are assigned a strategy. Suppose there are two strategies A and B. NA
number of players assigned to play strategy A and NB number of players assigned to play
strategy B. The payoff matrix for the game is:
A B

A
a

B c


b


d

A gets payoff a when playing against A and gets payoff b when playing against B; B
gets payoff c when playing against A and gets payoff d when playing against B. Denote
the frequency of A by xA where xA =

NA
NB
and the frequency of B by xB where xB =
.
N
N

The players’ payoff is resulted from each strategy’s proportion of the the population in
conjunction with its payoff matrix due to each players random interaction with opponent
players. If the payoff for the player who choose to play strategy A denoted by fA and
who choose to play strategy B denoted by fB , then the expected payoff is respectively;
fA = axA + bxB
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fB = cxA + dxB

Here payoffs depend on the relative proportions and which is called fitness. The average
fitness of the population is
φ = xA fA (~x) + xB fB (~x) where ~x = (xA , xB )
And the frequency-dependent selection dynamics between strategies A and B or selection
dynamics can be written as
x˙A = xA [fA (~x) − φ]
x˙B = xB [fB (~x) − φ]
Since xA + xB = 1 all the time, xA = x and xB = 1 − x can be written, and the fitness
function became
ẋ = x(1 − x)(fA − fB )
There are five possibilities for the selection of dynamics between two strategies.
• A dominates B, if a > c and b > d and population will favor A and eventually
whole population will have A players with xA = 1. A is a strict Nash equilibrium.
• B dominates A, if a < c and b < d and population will favor B and eventually
whole population will have B players with xB = 1. B is a strict Nash equilibrium.
• A and B are bi-stable. If a > c and b < d, then the interior equilibrium x∗ =
d−b
is unstable. A and B are both strict Nash equilibria.
a−b−c+d
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• A and B coexist. If a < c and b > d, then the interior equilibrium x∗ =

d−b
a−b−c+d

is stable. Neither A nor B is a Nash equilibrium.
• A and B are neutral, if a = c and b = d. The payoff will be always same as your
competitor no matter what you choose.
The Moran Process
The Moran process or Moran model is a simple stochastic process used in biology to
describe finite populations. This process named after the population geneticist P.A.P
Moran in 1958.

Assume a well-mixed population consists of i individuals of type A and N −i individuals
of type B. The probability of choosing an A individual is given by
B individual is given by

i
and choosing a
N

N −i
. At each time step, the number of A individuals either
N

remain unchanged or move to i − 1 or i + 1. A randomly chosen individual is replaced
by an identical offspring, therefore the population size remains constant. One step of the
Moran processes can have four possibilities.
• An A individual can be chosen for reproduction or death. This event has probability
 2
i
N
• A B individual can be chosen for reproduction or death. This event has probability

2
N −i
N
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• An A individual can be chosen for reproduction while a B individual chosen for
death. This event has probability

i(N − i)
.
N2

• A B individual can be chosen for reproduction while an A individual chosen for
death. This event has probability

i(N − i)
.
N2

For the Moran process, the following transition matrix is obtained:
pi,i−1 =

i(N − i)
N2

pi = 1 − pi,i+1 − pi,i−1
pi,i+1 =

i(N − i)
N2

pi,k = 0 if k > i + 1 or k < i − 1
The states 0 and N are absorbing states.
By using the Moran process, the selection dynamics of the game with N players can
formulated. At each time step, an individual chosen to reproduce proportional to its
fitness. If the fitness of an individual using the strategy A is fi and the fitness of an
individual using the strategy B is gi and given by
fi = a(i − 1) + b(N − i)
gi = ci + d(N − i − 1)
The probability of adding an A offspring is

i
. Therefore, the transition
ifi + (N − i)gi

matrix of the Moran process defines a birth death process and the transition matrix is as
follows;
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i
N −i
ifi + (N − i)gi N

Pi,i−1 =

i
(N − i)fi
ifi + (N − i)gi N

Pi,i = 1 − Pi,i+1 − Pi,i−1
and all other entries of the transition matrix is 0.
The process has two absorbing states i = 0 and i = N : once a population has reached
either of these states, it will stay there forever. If xi is the probability of reaching state
N when starting from state i, obviously 1 − xi is the probability of reaching state 0 when
starting from state i. Then, the recursive relation is
x0 = 0
xi = Pi,i+1 xi+1 + Pi,i xi + Pi,i−1 xi−1
xN = 1
The solution to this given by Karlin and Taylor [15]
Pi−1 Qj gk
1 + j=1
k=1
fk
xi =
PN −1 Qj gk
1 + j=1 k=1
fk
Let’s say a population contains N −1 B individuals and one A individual. The probability
that A takes over the whole population is called fixation probability of A. Similarly, the
probability that B takes over the whole population is called fixation probability of B.
The idea behind the fixation probability is the probability of a newly introduced mutant
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to become fixed in the population. If one denote the fixation probability of A by ρA and
fixation probability of B by ρB . The fixation probabilities of A and B are
ρ A = x1 =
1+

1
PN −1 Qj
j=1

ρB = 1 − xN −1 =
1+

k=1

gk
fk

QN −1 gk
k=1
fk
PN −1 Qj
j=1

k=1

gk
fk

Observe that the ratio of the fixation probabilities;
ρB QN −1 gk
= k=1
ρA
fk
Best-Response Dynamics
In best-response dynamics opponents seek for pure Nash Equilibrium.
Let’s denote the set of players by N and the set of strategies of the players by S =
(s1 , s2 , ..., sn ). Set s−i ∈ S−i as the strategy of the players except the player i’s strategy
such that S−i = (s1 , ..., si−1 , si+1 , ..., sn )
Bi is the best response function of the player i and Bi (s−i ) is the function of strategies
of players except player i which maps from S−i to Si
si ∈ Bi (s−i ) is the best response to s−i if and only if ∀si ∈ Si ui (s−i , si ) ≥ ui (s−i , s∗i )
∀s∗i ∈ Si where ui is the utility function for the player i
There are five possibilities for the selection of dynamics between two strategies.
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• A dominates B, if a > c and b > d and population will favor A and eventually
whole population will have A players with xA = 1. A is a strict Nash equilibrium.
• B dominates A, if a < c and b < d and population will favor B and eventually
whole population will have B players with xB = 1. B is a strict Nash equilibrium.
• A and B are bi-stable. If a > c and b < d, then the interior equilibrium x∗ =
d−b
is unstable. A and B are both strict Nash equilibria.
a−b−c+d
• A and B coexist. If a < c and b > d, then the interior equilibrium x∗ =

d−b
a−b−c+d

is stable. Neither A nor B is a Nash equilibrium.
• A and B are neutral, if a = c and b = d. The payoff will be always same as your
competitor no matter what you choose.

Chapter 3
The Model
In this thesis, simulations are done with two games, The Stag Hunt Game [30] which
is a cooperative game and The Hawk-Dove Game which is an adversarial game. It is assumed that a network of players where interactions are between players who are connected
directly to each other through a link/edge. These directly connected players referred as
mutual neighbors. Each player is assigned a single strategy which they use to interact
with each direct connection (neighbor). After interacting with all neighbors, players enter
a decision phase to re-evaluate their choice of strategy. As players in the network enter
this decision phase, they decide whether to choose a different strategy or to play the
previous strategy again. This introduces a dynamism in the network leading to evolution
of strategies as the game progresses through several rounds. The study of this dynamism
is the main idea in this thesis.

The evolutionary dynamics depends on the algorithm used in the decision process.
It is possible to design an algorithm that depends only on relative payoffs of players
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with respect to their neighbors. An algorithm that incorporates relative “influence” or
“importance” of players on their neighbors and vice-versa can also be designed.

In this thesis, first the dynamism with payoff based decision algorithm and then with
an algorithm that uses a Fermi like function, incorporating “importance” of players along
with their payoffs to choose the next strategy is studied. A player’s “importance” is now
defined in relation to its position in the network. Various measures of “importance” in
this chapter is presented and it is shown in Chapter 6 that complex networks have more
continuous distribution of importance values while regular networks such as grid have few
discrete levels of importance.

The evolution of strategies is also expected to have different progression depending
on the structure of the network. Experiments which is done in this thesis show this
to be true for both decision algorithms, with payoff alone and with “importance” and
payoff. Experiment with various network structures ranging from regular to complex
and random are done. In order to experiment with a variety of complex networks, a
Facebook friendship dataset is used as a model. Using this model, synthetic networks
such as Watts-Strogatz and Barabasi-Albert that have the same average degree of nodes
as in the Facebook dataset are created. In the rest of this chapter, this model explained
in details.
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Games

Experiments are done with Stag Hunt and Hawk Dove games which are played on
various types of networks. Stag Hunt game is a cooperation game and a maximum payoff
is obtained by players when players cooperate to obtain the highest payoff. Hawk Dove
game is the conflict game, the hawks represent the ’aggressive’ strategy and the doves
represent ’shy’ ones. From now on players with Stag Strategy will be now known as Stags
and players with Hare strategy will be now known as Hares. For the Hawks Dove game
players with Hawk strategy will be called Hawks and players with Dove strategy will be
called Doves.

3.1.1

Stag Hunt Game

The Stag Hunt game is motivated by the story told by Rousseau [30]. In this game
there are two people in a forest hunting for a stag and a hare. It is necessary for both
hunters to cooperate to be able to hunt stag but cooperation is not needed if they hunt
hare. If both hunters choose to hunt the hare they will both have the success and hence
the same payoff. If both decide to work together to hunt stag, they would both receive
the highest payoff. However, if one of the hunters tries to hunt hare while other tries to
hunt stag, the one who is trying to hunt stag will get nothing while the other hunter can
still catch a hare. The Stag Hunt game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, (Stag, Stag)
and (Hare, Hare). The strategy (Stag, Stag) has a higher payoff for both players when
compared to the strategy (Hare, Hare) so the strategy (Stag, Stag) is payoff dominant.
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On the other hand, if there is an uncertainty regarding other player’s action the strategy
(Hare, Hare) risk dominates (Stag,Stag) strategy. The payoffs are shown in the following
table.
STAG
HARE

STAG
a,a
b,c

HARE
c,b
d,d

Table 3.1: Stag Hunt

Assuming proportion of Stags in the network is x, then the expected value of payoffs
(also known as fitness) for Stags, fS and that of Hares is fH , can be calculated as:
fS = (x × a) + ((1 − x) × c)
fH = (x × b) + ((1 − x) × d)
Then the system should be in an equilibrium with equal number of Stags and Hares when
the following holds about the proportion of each players and the reward structures:
x=

1
1− a−b
c−d

In the simulations the following payoff matrix is use. When both players hunt Stag
they will both get equal payoff of 4, when both hunt Hare their payoff will be 3. If one
player tries to hunt Hare while other tries to hunt Stag, Stags will get nothing while Hares
gets 3.
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STAG
HARE

STAG
4,4
3,0

HARE
0,3
3,3

Table 3.2: Payoff Matrix which is used for this experiments

Figure 3.1: Payoff for the Stags and Hares when the initial percentage of Stags change

With the given payoff values, the relation between proportion of Stags in the population
and the fitness of Stags and Hare (Figure 3.1) can be plotted. As it appears, Hares’ fitness
doesn’t depend on the proportion of Stags in population since b = d in the payoff matrix
which is used in this study. On the contrary, Stags’ fitness increases with the proportion
of Stags in the population. Therefore, if conditions favor a Stag population, the entire
population is expected to turn into Stags. However, in a purely payoff based dynamism,
in order for the Stag population to increase, there needs to be atleast 75% of Stags in the
neighborhood. As seen later in this thesis, in complex networks, this favorable condition
exists even if the average number of Stags in the whole population is less than 75%. This
is attributed to clustering effect in complex networks when small regions may reach the
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75% proportion within their cluster even though the entire population is still less than
75% Stags. It is seeing during the simulation that pockets of Stags are able to drive the
emergence of cooperation in the network with fewer Stags than expected.

In order to understand the population dynamics before 75%, at 75%, and after 75% the
replicator dynamics equation [33] is used to plot the change in the fitness of Stags and
Hare in the population with time as several rounds of the game is played. It is also shown
how fitness affects the size of the population as the game progresses in an unstructured,
well mixed population where all players interact with all other players. Figures 3.2,
3.3, 3.4 show the fitness values for Stag and Hare at the starting percentage of Stags
is 74%, 75% and 76% respectively . Dotted lines represent the fitness of strategies and
solid lines represent the proportion of Stags and Hare in the population. When fitness
of Stags increase proportion of Stag strategy increases and the system is at rest when
the percentage of Stags is 75%. For any initial population the fitness can be found by
referring to this graph. These graphs are expected to guide us to understand the results
when a structured network is used instead of a well mixed population.
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Figure 3.2: Replicator Dynamics of the population when start with 74% Stag Strategy in
a perfect graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB

Figure 3.3: Replicator Dynamics of the population when start with 75% Stag Strategy in
a perfect graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB
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Figure 3.4: Replicator Dynamics of the population when start with 76% Stag Strategy in
a perfect graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB

3.1.2

Hawk-Dove Game

Maynard Smith and Parker analyzed the Hawk Dove game in their paper in 1976 [32].
This is an adversarial game where two types of player interact with each other. The
aggressive player is named Hawk and the mild player is named Dove. When Hawk and
Dove compete of the common resource, they game a value of V and pay a cost C. If
Hawks compete with each other, they each win half the time and loose the half of the
time. Therefore, the net payoff for the Hawks is

V −C
. On the other hand when Hawk
2

competes with Dove, the Hawk gets all of the resource without paying any costs since
Dove’s don’t fight. When two Doves compete with each other, they share the resources
equally and hence they each receive a payoff of
they share without a fight.

V
and they don’t pay any cost because
2
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It is assumed that value of the resource less than the cost that Hawk’s pay when fighting
for it i.e C > V > 0. Payoff matrix for Hawk Dove game is shown below.

HAWK
DOVE

HAWK
V −C
2
0

DOVE
V
V
2

Table 3.3: Payoff Matrix for Hawk Dove Game

Clearly, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game which are playing
(Dove, Hawk) or (Hawk, Dove). There is also mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which can
be calculated as following.
Assuming the proportion of Hawk in a population is x, then the fitness of Hawk is

fH = x ∗

V −C
2


+ (1 − x) ∗ V

fitness of Dove strategy is
fD = x ∗ (0) + (1 − x)

V
2

Therefore mixed strategy equilibrium can be calculated as follows,

x∗

V −C
2


+ (1 − x) ∗ V = x ∗ (0) + (1 − x)

x=

V
.
C

V
2
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This shows that if the proportion of Hawks in the population is

V
, the fitness of both
C

Hawk and Dove strategies in the population is same and both should co-exist in the
population. Results in this study in complex networks, shows that the population never
reaches this stability if payoff is the only determining factor in the evolutionary dynamics.

The following payoff matrix for this game is used for the simulations

HAWK
DOVE

HAWK
-1, -1
0,2

DOVE
2, 0
1,1

Table 3.4: Payoff Matrix for Hawk Dove Game which is used in simulations in this study

In this case V = 2 and C = 4. According to listed calculations as above fitness of Hawk
1
and Dove strategies are equal when x = .
2
Payoff values from TABLE IV is used for the experiments in this work. When Hawk
meet with another Hawk the payoff is -1. On the other hand, when Hawk meets with
Dove, Hawk will get 2 while Dove meets with Hawk, Dove gets nothing. Dove meets with
another Dove they share the resources and get the payoff 1.
Using the payoff values from Table IV the fitness values for the Hawk and Dove with
respect to initial population of Hawk can be calculated.
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Figure 3.5: Payoff for the Hawks and Doves when the initial percentage of Hawks change

As one can see, there is a negative slope which means absolute fitness is decreasing for
every additional Hawk is introduced to the population. Hawks have a lower fitness than
the Dove while Hawk population increases, in like manner Dove’s fitness is also decreasing
in proportion to the Hawk. Which means Hawk are fitter than the Doves when x is small
because

x∗

V −C
2


+ (1 − x) ∗ V > x ∗ (0) + (1 − x)

V
2

Later in this thesis it will be seen that neither Hawk nor Dove are evolutionary stable
strategy, which is why the population does not reach a steady state. Once Hawk is
introduced to the population it is not possible to keep them out of the population. This
result is also observed using the replicator equation. The replicator dynamics of the
population in Figures 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 that for a population with all initial proportions of
Hawks, the population slowly converges to 50% of Hawks and Doves each. Therefore, in
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networks with clusters of Hawk and Dove populations, players will continue to oscillate
between Hawk and Dove strategies in subsequent rounds of the game, and the network
will never reach a stead state. Another result which one can extract from the Payoff
graph that Hawks are damaging to the population as their population increases since the
presence of Hawks reduces the overall utility of the entire population.

Figure 3.6: Replicator Dynamics of the population when start with 40% Hawk Strategy
in a perfect graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB

CHAPTER 3. THE MODEL

38

Figure 3.7: Replicator Dynamics of the population when start with 50% Hawk Strategy
in a perfect graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB

Figure 3.8: Replicator Dynamics of the population when start with 60% Hawk Strategy
in a perfect graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB

3.2

Game Dynamics

After each round of interactions with neighbors, players evaluate their own performance
relative to their neighbors. Then the players might switch their strategy for the next
round. This leads to changes in the network composition in terms of the proportion of
each type of players. First, experiments are done with a payoff based dynamics followed
by one in which both payoff and structural differences and hence “importance” in the
network are used in selecting strategies for subsequent rounds. In both cases, the network
is memory-less, i.e., historical choices of strategy do not affect choices in future rounds.
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Payoff Based Dynamics

In this thesis, a variation of the best-response dynamics is used as the payoff based decision process. It is assumed that each player only has information about each neighbor’s
strategy and average payoff. This fact is used to decide which strategy to follow in the
next round of the game. This decision is made synchronously by all players at the end
of a round of game. First the payoff Pi for a player i is computed as the average payoff
from interactions with all neighbors N . Then the player compares Pi with the payoff Pj
of each neighbor j ∈ N . If Pi ≥ Pj ∀j ∈ N , then i continues to use the same strategy as
the current round. However if ∃j, Pj > Pk ∀k ∈ N , Pi < Pj and the strategies si 6= sj ,
then i switches strategy to sj .

However, in a large network, it is possible that some neighbors have the same highest
payoff but with opposing strategies. Thus the player j with the highest payoff is not
alone. Instead there is a set Ni 0 ⊂ Ni of neighbors of i, such that the payoffs of all players
k ∈ Ni 0 are equal and higher than any neighbor m ∈ Ni − Ni 0. However the strategies
of different players in Ni 0 are different, showing that opposing strategies can lead to the
same average payoff.

CHAPTER 3. THE MODEL

40

Figure 3.9: When there is a tie in terms of payoff between neighbors Players choose one
of the 3 strategies, majority, random, or staying with the same strategy

The model which is introduced in this thesis differs from prior research due to the
explicit recognition of possible ties between players and application of various tie-breaking
strategies. These three different strategies were analyzed separately.
Suppose |Ni 0| > 1 i.e, there are more than one neighbors of i who received the same
highest payoffs but had played different strategies.
• Choose Majority: Follow the strategy that more players in the set Ni 0 followed
• Choose Randomly: Randomly switch to the one of the two strategies
• No Change: Since there is no advantage of one strategy over another, keep the
same strategy as the current round.
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Payoff and Influence Based Dynamics

Most of the results in evolutionary game theory has considered payoffs from interaction between neighbors to implement the dynamism. Only recently, researchers started
focusing on incorporating the heterogeneity of complex networks in terms of influence
exerted by nodes on their neighbors. In this thesis, centrality measures derived from the
structural properties, such as node degree, their distance or closeness from others and
other such centrality measures, is used to define influence of players over each other.

In order to incorporate influence in the decision making process, a rule derived from
Fermi-Dirac distribution is used. The Fermi-Dirac distribution is defined as
f (E) =

1
,
E − EF
+1
e kB × T

where kB is a constant. A similar distribution is derived in terms of rewards and influence
of nodes relative to their neighbors. The resulting distribution for player i calculated
against neighbor j is as follows:
fi⇒j =

e−(Ii −Ij )
1 + eRi −Rj

where Ii , Ij = influence of player i and neighbor j respectively and Ri , Rj are their average
rewards across all their neighbors. This equation is then used to calculate the probability
of imitating neighbor’s strategy, such that the likelihood to imitate players with higher
influence is higher. Each player computes the pairwise relation with each neighbor j ∈ Ni
by computing the value of the following function above.
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Then all players compute the maximum and minimum values of function f that is
possible in the network. These values can be obtained by computing f for a pair of
players with the highest and lowest influences in the network and the highest and lowest
reward differences respectively. Thus for the Stag Hunt game and the payoff matrix used
in this thesis : fmax =

e−(Imax −Imin )
e−(Imin −Imax )
and
f
=
. The highest and lowest
min
1 + e3
1 + e−3

payoff difference in a Hawk Dove game is also +3 and -3 respectively. Therefore, the two
games have the same fmax and fmin and the values are the same for all players in a given
network. For each player, the value of a threshold t is computed as t =

fi − fmin
where
fmin

fi = argmax(f (i ⇒ j))∀j ∈ Ni . Then fi is the probability that player i would switch its
strategy to the player j such that f (i ⇒ j) is the highest among all neighbors Ni of i.
It is easy to see that if i is a player with highest influence among all neighbors, the probability fi is low while the probability fj for a player j with low influence is high. At the
same time, the probability of a player with high influence but a losing strategy would
have a high probability to switch strategy to another player who has an equivalent or a
slightly lower influence but a winning strategy. Following this model leads to different
evolutionary path toward a steady state population in most types of networks, specifically when the influence becomes more heterogeneous as the complexity of the network
increases. Experimental results and observations are presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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Network Structures and Parameters

In a graph representation of a networked system, there are two fundamental components, nodes and edges. In terms of evolutionary game theory, nodes in a graph represent individual players, and edges represents connections through which players interact.
This section consists of three fundamental types of graphs, regular, random and scalefree/complex. Grid and Torus graphs have a regular structure where nodes are connected
to each other through edges that are uniformly placed following a fixed pattern throughout the graph. Random and Watz-Strogatz graphs are categorized by random connections
across the structure with edges between nodes formed with uniform probability. Finally
the Barabasi-Albert graph and the Facebook dataset based graph are complex networks
where the node degree distribution follows a scale-free distribution. These types of graphs
are representative of real-world network structures such as transportation networks, the
world-wide-web and both online and offline social networks.

3.3.1

Grid and Torus Graphs

Grid is also known as lattice graph or mesh graph. In a Grid Network every node is
related to 2, 3, or 4 nodes and nodes are not connected diagonally. Square nxn Grid
Network consists of n2 nodes, 4 corners and 2n2 − 2n edges. Corner nodes have only two
neighbors while edge nodes have three neighbors. Nodes everywhere else have 4 neighbors
each.

CHAPTER 3. THE MODEL

44

Figure 3.10: Grid graph with 64 nodes in an 8x8 grid

Torus is a topological shape where the edges glue together. It is created from a square
lattice with top edges connected to the bottom edges and right edges connected to the
left edges. A Torus graph looks like a doughnut. The resulting structure does not have
any corners or edges; each node has exactly 4 neighbors. Figure 3.11 shows sample torus
graph with 64 nodes.

3.3.2

Random and Watts-Strogatz Graphs

Erdős and Reny̋i in 1969 [5] modeled purely random networks in which, the links
between nodes are formed with a given probability and is independent of other links that
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Figure 3.11: Torus graph with 64 nodes
exist in the network. Such networks have uniform distribution of node degrees. As shown
in Figure 3.12, all nodes have similar node degree and hence each node would be expected
to have similar measures of influence. The Erdős and Reny̋ model for random graph is
very popular in literature and it is used in this thesis to study the evolution of strategies
in random networks.

While Erdős-Reny̋i Networks have been used in the academic world, real life networks
are not completely random. Therefore, Watts and Strogatz [37] built models to generate
networks that would be intermediate between regular and completely random to emulate
the structure of real networks. In their model, Watts and Strogatz started with a ring
lattice with n-vertices where each vertex connected to its k nearest neighbors and they
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Figure 3.12: Erdős-Reny̋i graph constructed using Python. In this graph, there are 64
nodes and probability of edge creation is 4
rewire the edges to a random node with probability p.

When p is small, the network is close to the original regular lattice structure and when p
is large the network similar to the classical random graph. Watts and Strogatz studied the
situation between these two limits. Mainly they measured the path length L(p) and the
clustering coefficient C(p). Networks which has sparse connection but not much sparse
where there is no connection was Watts and Strogatz’s main interest. Having even a very
small p hasn’t changed C(p) much while L(p) decreases immediately. Rewiring even a
small number of edges caused average path length to fall promptly.
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Figure 3.13: Watts-Strogatz graph created using Python. In this graph, there are 64
nodes, each node is connected to 4 nearest neighbors in ring topology, the probability of
rewiring each edge is 0.5 and seed for random number generator is in default setting
Watts and Strogatz calculated C and L for three different networks: the network of
collaborations between movie actors, the neural network of the worm C. Elegans, and the
Western Power Grid of the United States. ( C defined as average of fraction of allowable
edges over all vertexes and L is the average number of friendship in the shortest chain
connecting two people.)

3.3.3

Bárabasi-Albert and Facebook Dataset

Unlike in random graphs where any random node in the network has about the same
number of links as the average node, real-world networks have a scale-free property.
In real-network graphs, the node degree can fluctuate widely from the average. This
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Lactual

Lrandom

Cactual

Crandom

3.65
18.7
2.65

2.99
12.4
2.25

0.79
0.080
0.28

0.00027
0.005
0.05

Table 3.5: Characteristic path length L and clustering coefficient C compared to the
random graph. Number of vertices n and average number of edges per vertex k. (Actors:
n = 225, 226, k = 61. Power grid: n = 4, 941, k = 2.67. C. Elegans: n = 282, k = 14.
property is attributed to the phenomenon of preferential attachment in a graph and is
also responsible for the small world phenomenon that were studied by Gurevich[10] and
Milgram [35] in 1961 and 1967 respectively. Thus, in contrast with the Erdős and Reny̋i
model, the evolution of many practical networks depends on the structure of the network
it is evolving from. For example, the probability that a link ij is created from nodes
i to node j in the graph g, is proportional to the number of links that are incident
upon j already. This phenomenon, also known as rich get richer process, is found in
social networks, citation and collaboration graphs, the world wide web and routers in the
Internet.

Bárabasi and Albert [1] studied the structure of the world wide web and found a power
law (P (d) ≈ cd−γ ) degree distribution i.e, if the degree d is increased by a factor k, the
frequency of nodes with degree kd is reduced by a factor k −γ . These networks are also
called scale-free because the ratio P (di )/P (dj ) only depends on the ratio di /dj regardless
of the scale of the degrees i.e., P (2)/P (1) = P (20)/P (10).Figure 3.14 shows a BA-graph
with 64 nodes, each node connected to 4 existing nodes in the network following the

CHAPTER 3. THE MODEL

49

concept of preferential attachment.

Figure 3.14: Bárabasi-Albert graph constructed using Python. In this graph, there are
64 nodes, 4 edges to attach from a new node to existing nodes

A Facebook dataset is used in this thesis as a representative for real-world scale-free
network. This network has 4039 nodes with average degree of nodes being 131. However,
the median degree is just 75 and average of distinct degrees over all nodes is 365. This
statistics shows the heterogenity of nodes in the network as it can be seen from the graph
representation of this network in Figure 3.15.

3.3.4

Network Parameters

In order to generate networks that are comparable to the Facebook dataset in size,
it is important to first analyze the properties of the Facebook Network sample dataset.
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Figure 3.15: Graph representation of the Facebook Dataset with 4039 nodes
The parameters important to this study are the distribution of degrees in the Facebook
Network and the size of the network. While all properties cannot be replicated in each
type of network in the range from regular to random, the size and scale of the network
can be replicated.
Therefore, for the Facebook Network average degree of nodes, average of distinct degrees
among nodes, median of degrees and average of total number edges are calculated.
of degrees of all nodes
Average Degree= Sum Number
of nodes

Distinct Degree Average =

Sum of distinct degrees among all nodes
Number of nodes with distinct degrees

Median = Median of node degrees

Average Edges =

Sum of degrees of all nodes
2×Total number of nodes
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The Facebook sample data consist of 4039 users [18]. The results for the metrics above
are presented in table 3.6.
Parameter
Average Degree
Distinct Degree Average
Median
Average Edges

Value
131
365
75
66

Table 3.6: Parameters of Facebook Network sample dataset

In Grid and Torus Networks, the size of the Facebook Network is recreated by using a
64 × 64 grid to built networks with 4096 nodes each. Parameters for Random and WattsStrogatz Networks are set to match the degree parameters from the Facebook Network.
For Random Networks, the probability p for edge creation is set to p =

d
using the
4039

above parameters. The experiments were run for each parameter where d = Average
degree, distinct degree average, median, and average edges.
In Watts-Strogatz Network k, number of nearest neighbors in ring topology for each
node, is set to the average degree,distinct degree average, median and average edge. p,
the probability of rewiring each edge, kept asis set to p = 0.5 so that the resulting network
is half way from regular lattice and random networks.

The graph of Bárabasi-Albert changes depending on changing the number of edges k
to attach from a new node to existing nodes. In order to generate a network equivalent
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to the Facebook Network, cumulative distribution of node degrees for various values of
k in the Bárabasi-Albert Network is plotted. Figure 3.16 shows that attaching 22 edges
from a new node to existing nodes was the closest parameter to use for Bárabasi-Albert
Network to create a network that is comparable with the Facebook Network.

Figure 3.16: Cumulative distribution node degrees in Bárabasi-Albert Network with parameter k=22 edges and in the Facebook Network sample

3.4

Influence

In prior work, influence metric to each node in the network is assigned through random
choice. In this thesis, the network structure is used to compute influence based on structural property and location of the node in the network. In terms of real-world analogy,
this is a fair assignment since nodes of higher influence enjoy a more central location as
characterized by their degrees as well as closeness to other nodes. In network science,
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the concept of centrality has been extensively discussed to mathematically calculate this
influence or importance.

The idea of centrality was first developed by Bavelas in 1948 in his paper ”A Mathematical Model for Group Structures”[2]. He proposed that a person is in a central position
in a group when the person is strategically located on the shortest path connecting other
pairs. Then in the light of this idea experiments are directed by Bavelas and conducted by
Leavit (1949,1951), Smith (1950) and Bavelas and Barrett (1951). In 1977, Freeman [6]
used these original ideas and developed measures that are meaningful in communication
networks.

In this section four measures of centrality is discussed: Degree Centrality, Closeness
Centrality, Betweenness Centrality and Eigenvector Centrality.

3.4.1

Betweenness Centrality

Betweenness-based centrality measure was introduced by Freeman in 1977 [6]. If gij
is the number of geodesics connecting ai and aj and pij is the probability where ak is
located on a randomly selected geodesic connecting ai and aj , then pij calculated as
pij (ak ) =

1
(gij (ak ))
gij

where gij (ak ) is the number of geodesics connecting ai and aj that contain ak .
In order to find the overall centrality of ak , partial betweenness values are summed up to
obtain:
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CB (ak ) =

Pn Pn
i

j

pij (ak )

where i < j and n is the number of points in the graph. The relative centrality is
calculated as:
CB0 (ak ) =

3.4.2

2CB (ak )
n2 − 3n + 2

Degree Centrality

In 1954 Shaw [29] proposed the idea of degree centrality. In 1974 Nieminen [24] defined
the degree centrality as an importance of a node and measured it as a sum of the connected
vertices where if ai and aj has a direct link d(ai , aj ) = 1, if ai and aj has no direct link
d(ai , aj ) = 0 and
CD (ak ) =

PN

i=1

d(ai , aj )

Then in 1978 Freeman [7] gave mathematical formula for the degree centrality. Since
a node can be connected to at most n − 1 nodes in a graph which has n nodes
0
CD
(ak ) =

PN

d(ai , aj )
n−1

i=1

is the degree centrality of the node ak in a graph. Let CD (a∗ ) is the largest value of degree
centrality of a node ai , then
PN

CD (G) =

∗
i=1 [CD (a ) − CD (ai )]
P
∗
max N
i=1 [CD (a ) − CD (ai )]

is the degree centrality of a graph.
Maximum value of CD (a∗ ) is n − 1 and minimum value of CD (ai ) is 1, therefore
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CD (a∗ ) − CD (ai ) = (n − 1) − 1 = n − 2
and maximum possible sum of differences
(n − 2)(n − 1) = n2 − 3n + 2
Then the degree centrality of a graph calculated using;
PN
[CD (a∗ ) − CD (ai )]
CD (G) = i=1 2
n − 3n + 2

3.4.3

Closeness Centrality

Bavelas mentioned closeness centrality in 1948 [2] as reciprocal of “farness”. Closeness
Centrality measures the distance of a node in the social network to all other nodes. The
assumption for the closeness centrality is nodes that are important are short distance
away from all other nodes in the network. The farness of a node is defined as the sum of
its shortest distance to all other nodes, and closeness is defined as its inverse. The more
central a node is in the network, the lower is its total distance to all other nodes.
To measure the Closeness Centrality of a node i,first the distances of a node to all other
nodes added:
P

∀i6=j

d(i, j)

where d(i, j) is the distance between i and j. Closeness Centrality should be higher for
the node closer to the other nodes in the network (such a node is more central in the
network). Therefore, Closeness Centrality of a node can be measured by the ratio,
N −1
∀i6=j d(i, j)

Cclose (i) = P
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Given the model explained in this chapter, the evolution of strategies in two two player
games are simulated in Chapter 6. The next chapter explains a framework that is used
to implement this model and build a simulation software that can be instrumented to
experiment with various network configurations, games and evolutionary dynamics.

Chapter 4
Framework
As described in prior chapters, evolutionary game theory applies the concept of game
theory in a population to study the process of evolution. In evolutionary game theory,
payoffs determine the survival of one strategy over another in a Darwinian like competition. Application of evolutionary game theory was first found in biology before it became
evident that the same research can be applied elsewhere such as to the study of information and opinion in networks. Understanding the results of games between nodes in a
network, not only helps scientists gain insights on how information can travel but it also
shows how clusters of similar strategies are formed. It is interesting to observe how these
clusters can be resistant to change.

This study can be performed using any game expressed in the form of strategies and
payoffs. Contests between players in the game result in different payoffs which can be
expressed as a change in the ratio of each strategy, starting at an initial ratio and changing
over various rounds of the game until a steady state is reached. A generic framework that
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can simulate this contest between players in any game in a variety of networks was created.
This framework, built using the Python 3.0 programming language, takes various inputs,
such as the game in the form of a payoff matrix, a function containing the rule of evolution
and an adjacency matrix that defines the structure of the network. Then the simulation
runs for a given number of rounds, and can be repeated to obtain average result. Different
modules are built to generate the adjacency matrices that represent different network
structures as examples and provide sample outputs in the form of spreadsheets and plots
drawn using Python MatplotLib library.

In this framework, the networked game is initialized by random assignment of strategies
to nodes in the network. This can be customized with assignments of given strategies
to specific nodes. As the game is played over several rounds, the strategies chosen in
each round by various nodes change until a steady state is reached. Repeating the game
with different random assignment of strategies to network nodes is recommended to obtain
average results. After several different initial assignments, the framework, that keeps a log
of initial and final composition of strategies, computes averages in terms of the initial and
final percentage of players following each strategy. In this chapter, the overall architecture
of this framework is described and each component in terms of its inputs, outputs and
algorithm is explained. A schematic diagram of the framework is shown in Figure 4.1.
Primary components of the framework are (a) a block for generating networks based on
research specifications and conversion of network data into inputs to the simulation, (b)
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assignment of initial game strategies to players/nodes in the network, (c) decision logic
for the evolutionary dynamics as the game repeats several times, (d) game played in the
network and (e) the output as raw data and plots. This framework and code will be
discussed in the following sections.

Figure 4.1: Framework of the Model which is used in this experiments
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Generating Networks

The Python networkX[11] library has several built-in functions to generate a variety
of networks. These functions are generally used to visualize networks in a variety of
layouts. Besides the visual data, the libraries also provide the Graph as output which can
be converted to an adjacency matrix using the Python Numpy library. This adjacency
matrix can be used to specify properties of each node in the network and to compute
properties such as centrality and connectivity of each node.
In order to build a modular program, a class with a collection of wrapper functions
is created. The class itself stored parameters such as number of nodes and network
specific parameters such as probability of link creation. Then the wrapper functions
contain the networkx logic that builds the graph of choice and returns the adjacency
matrix computed using the numpy library. This class is overloaded to add more wrapper
functions as needed. Care should be taken to add any additional parameters to the class
when extending this class.
The base class, developed for this framework includes, Grid, Torus, Random, WattsStrogatz, Bárabasi-Albert Networks. Additionally, a wrapper function is written to generated the adjacency matrix corresponding to a dataset from the Facebook Network. For
this wrapper function, the dataset from McAuley and Leskovec [18] is used. First the
cleaned data is loaded into a database that contained connectivity tables for each node
in the network. Then the adjacency matrix is built from the database by querying the
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connectivity table of each node.

In this thesis, since there were 4039 vertices in the Facebook Network, 4096 vertices
were chosen for Torus, Grid, Random, Watts-Strogatz Networks. The Bárabasi-Albert
Network is built with 4039 nodes.
In order to generate the Random, Watts-Strogatz and Bárabasi-Albert networks, the
networkx libraries are used to create the graph and numpy is used to build the adjacency
matrix. Since grid and torus are not standard libraries in networkx, a code is created to
generate the matrices for the specified number of nodes with the input being the number
of rows/columns in the network.
Here is an excerpt of the class Graph, the wrapper function that is used to generate
Bárabasi-Albert network and usage of the wrapper functions to generate inputs for evolutionary dynamics simulation in this thesis.

class Graph(object):
__matrix = []
__num_nodes = 0
def __init__(self, nodes):
self.__num_nodes = nodes
self.__matrix = np.zeros((nodes,nodes))

def make_ba(self, nodes, k):
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g = nx.barabasi_albert_graph(nodes,k)
self.__matrix = nx.to_numpy_matrix(g)
return self.__matrix

import build_graph
def barabasi_albert():
b=build_graph.Graph(num_nodes)
adj_mat= b.make_ba(num_nodes,degree)
return adj_mat, len(adj_mat), num_nodes

In this thesis, the grid and torus networks are 64x64 latices. The torus is generated
by wrapping the edges around to build a donut shape. Random Networks are built
using the networkx library function that takes a parameter p to indicate the probability
of connecting to a random node. Similarly the Watz Strogatz network is built using
the networkx library where a parameter k is used to determine the cluster size i.e., the
number of neighbors that a node initially connects with and a parameter p which is the
probability of re-wiring. The parameters, k and p which is used in this thesis for Random
and Watts-Strogatz networks are given in the following tables.

k

Average Degree Distinct Degree
131
365

Median
75

Average Edges
66

Table 4.1: Watts-Strogatz network parameter
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p
0.032
0.09
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Median
0.0183

Average Edges
0.0161

Table 4.2: Random Network parameter

4.2

Assignment of initial strategies

In Evolutionary Game theory, scientists have often considered placing a particular
strategy on specific nodes. The choice of these nodes might depend on their location in the
network or random depending on the study that is being performed. This study evaluates
random assignment of strategies such that all nodes were equally likely to be assigned
either one of the game strategies. Therefore, the default function in this framework,
generates a random number matrix for all nodes in the network. Then it goes through
the list of all nodes in the network, to assign strategies based on the number that was
generated for that node. Assuming that the initial fraction of nodes with strategy A is
set as k by the experimenter. Then if the random number generated by the program for
a node is less than or equal to k, the node is assigned strategy A, otherwise it is assigned
strategy B. Since random assignments may not always yield the specified percentage of
each strategy when the number of nodes is small, a margin of error  is set. If the random
assignment leads to fewer than k −  or more than k + , logic was re-run to generate
another set until the desired percentage within the margin of error is achieved. This logic
is shown in the function below.
#Sets initial strategy of the game
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def set_strategy(self, ratio):
s = 1.0
ulimit = ratio+e*ratio
llimit = ratio-e*ratio
while (s < llimit or s >ulimit):
mat = np.random.rand(self.__matrix[:,0].size,1)
for i in range(0,self.__matrix[:,0].size):
if mat[i] <= ratio:
mat[i] = 2
else:
mat[i] = 1
self.__strategy = list(mat[:,0])
s = self.__strategy.count(2)/float(len(self.__strategy))

return s

def set_given_strategy(self,strategy):
self.__strategy = strategy

An experimenter can choose to providing a list of strategy to preferred nodes in the
network by using the second function shown in the code listing above. This function takes
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a list of strategies and assigns it to the nodes directly.

4.3

Evolutionary dynamic

In evolutionary game theory, researchers have suggested several types of evolutionary
dynamics. In two player games, often the winning player replicates by placing an offspring
i.e., player who imitates the same strategy as the winning player takes the place of the
losing player. This type of dynamic is called replicator dynamics. In a network, when
there are multiple neighbors to play with, this dynamics should be revised to best response
or imitation based dynamics where each player imitates the neighbor who has the best
payoff in the previous round of the game.The change of strategy is implemented at the
end of every round as the best response dynamics. The function which implements the
dynamics can be overloaded to accommodate a different evolutionary dynamics by the
researcher. In a game played in a large network, it is not impossible for multiple players
to fair equally in a round of game even if their strategies differ from each other. In this
case, the players who earned lower payoffs will not have a unique choice of strategy in the
next round. In order to handle ties in payoffs with no unique winner, tie breaking rules
are implemented. It is possible to select from three tie breaking rules in this framework:
choose the majority strategy, choose a random strategy or keep your current strategy.
In this thesis, the third option is chosen since keeping the current strategy is a natural
choice in the absence of clear indication of what is best.
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Statistical results

Statistical generalization is necessary when there is randomness desired either in the
configuration of the network or the initial assignment of strategies. In this thesis, the
network is constant but initial strategies are randomly assigned. Therefore, it is important
for the games to be played several times with random initial strategy assignments in order
to obtain generalized results. However, some work in evolutionary game theory may only
be concerned with patterns that emerge during consecutive rounds of the game after a
specific initial assignment of strategies. Therefore to enable a wide variety of simulations,
parameters that can be tuned to run the simulation any number of times were provide ,
from 1 to n, where n can be any integer. Each time, the initial assignments of strategies can
be changed to a random or a semi-random setup. In this thesis, each player plays the game
for 10-20 rounds depending on whether a steady state is observed, and the experiments
are repeated 100 times in order to compute the average percentage composition of the
final population with respect to an initial percentage composition.

4.5

Game Played in the Network

The most important information in an evolutionary game theory simulation is the game
itself. In this framework, the game is an input to the simulation as a payoff matrix. In
this version of the framework, the payoff matrix can represent a 2-player game. It is
possible to incorporate 3 or more players by changing the appropriate variables in the
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simulator and overloading functions. In this thesis, most of the results are for two games,
Stag-hunt and Hawk-Dove. The payoff matrices used in this thesis are shown below.
STAG
HARE

STAG
4,4
3,0

HARE
0,3
3,3

Table 4.3: Payoff Matrix for Stag Hunt Game which is used for experiments

HAWK
DOVE

HAWK
-1, -1
0,2

DOVE
2, 0
1,1

Table 4.4: Payoff Matrix for Hawk Dove Game which is used for experiments

4.6

Output from the simulator

As the simulated evolutionary game runs, a “stats” function in the program collects
data at each step. First, after the change of strategy at each round of the game, the stats
function is called to store the results of the round in terms of the fraction of players who
chose each strategy. When the game is repeated several times, the statistics for subsequent
rounds of the game are averaged over several repetitions to obtain the generalized data.
This data is plotted as the percentage of stags or hare vs. the number of rounds in the
game. A sample plot for the Stag Hunt game in a sample of the Facebook network is
shown in Figure 4.2.

In this framework, the initial fraction of each type of players can be varied through
a range of values. This range is provided as an input to the framework in to form of a
list of initial fractions. Given an initial fraction, the simulation also keeps track of the
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of strategy in a Stag hunt game in a sample of the Facebook network
final fraction as an average of multiple repetitions of the game. The output for initial
and final fractions, averaged over all repetitions for each initial fraction is provided as a
spreadsheet at the end of the simulation. An example of this output is shown in Figure 4.3.
The first columns in the spreadsheet represents the payoff matrix used in the game, the
second column is the average final fraction of Stag hunters and the third column is the
corresponding average initial fraction of Stag hunters. Note that the initial fraction is
within an error margin on 0.0001 of the desired initial fraction which were 0.4, 0.5, 0.55,
0.6, 0.63, 0.65, 0.68 , 0.70, 0.75, 0.78, 0.8, 0.85, 0.88, 0.9 and 0.95.

4.7

Extensions and Application

As mentioned in this chapter, this Framework was designed to enable research in Evolutionary Game Theory. This research has captured the most general case by implementing
the framework to support repeated 2-player games over a variety of networks. This
framework can be extended to incorporate games with 3 or 4 players by building the
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Figure 4.3: Output containing initial and final fraction of Stags in a Stag Hunt game
played in the sample Facebook network
appropriate payoff matrix and overloading functions that set initial strategies, decide on
the next strategy and collect statistics. The framework can easily be expanded to support
other network models by extending the class Graph to include new network models and
writing wrapper functions to convert a networkx graph data structure into a numpy adjacency matrix. The primary application of this framework is to perform statistical study
of evolution of game which is equivalent to spread of information in networks. In the
future, the framework is planned to be used for a variety of applications in information
and belief propagation.

Chapter 5
Results: Payoff based Strategy
Update
In this thesis, the Framework discussed in Chapter 4 was used to experiment with the
Stag Hunt and Hawk Dove games. In this chapter, results for payoff based evolutionary
dynamic is presented. Three tie breaking strategies as discussed in the model presented
in Chapter 3 were applied to the payoff based dynamics. Results presented here compare
the effect of tie breaking strategies on the steady state conditions for each type of network
in both games. In this Chapter, overall statistics regarding co-existence of strategies at
steady state, time to reach steady state and earlier conversion to dominant strategy are
presented and discussed.

5.1

Stag Hunt Game

As discussed in the Chapter 3, the Stag-Hunt game is a cooperation game. Analytical
computation using the payoff matrix presented in Chapter 3, shows that the population
needs to have 75% Stags initially to convert the entire population into Stag hunters.
70
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However, empirical results show that the final composition of the population may not
convert entirely to Stag hunters for some networks and in others, the population switches
to Stag hunting even before their critical mass of 75% Stags in the population.

5.1.1

Grid and Torus Networks

Both grid and torus networks are regular lattices and hence they show similar results.
The population in both networks fails to convert to 100% Stags except when there are
more than 90% of Stags in the initial population. It is easy to see why this is the case.
Since there are at-most four neighbors for any node in these networks, a Stag hunter can
have 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of Stag neighbors. Since the equilibrium between Stag and
Hare payoff is at 75%, there need to be more than 75% stags in the neighborhood for a
lone Hare hunter to switch its strategy unless they use a majority strategy to break ties
when neighbors have the same payoff with different strategies. With random assignment
of initial strategies, it is possible for clusters of 100% Stag neighbors to emerge but when
simulating several random assignments, the results average out to reflect that, on an
average, no configuration exists that results in 100% Stag population. Figure 5.1 shows
the average results for initial vs. final population of stags and hare in grid and torus
networks respectively.

It is also interesting to note that the network reaches steady state in a single round. This
is due to the uniformity of both networks. Due to the lack of diversity in connections, all
players in the network reach their optimal strategy immediately after playing one round
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Figure 5.1: Initial and final stag and hare population in grid and torus networks
of the game. Figures 5.2 show the evolution of strategies when the start percentage of
stag hunters in the game is 80% in grid and torus networks respectively.

5.1.2

Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks

The Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks were configured to imitate the node degree
parameters from the Facebook dataset as explained in Chapter 3. In both networks, Stag
hunters take over the population when the initial population has between 65% to 70% of
stags. The point at which this conversion happens depends on the degree parameter that
is imitated. As shown in Tables 5.2, the random networks generated with node degrees
that imitate the distinct degree average of Facebook Network needs 70% stags in the initial
population and Watts Strogatz needs 75% initial stags to convert the entire population to
stag hunters, Recall that the distinct degree average for facebook dataset was 365 which
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(b) Torus Network

Figure 5.2: Evolution of strategies in populations that start with 80% stags in grid and
torus networks
makes for a very dense network. Therefore, as the denstity of the network increases, the
results are closer to the analytical results where 75% of stags. However, networks that
imitate the average and median degree parameters and average edges parameter require
fewer stags in the initial population to result in a complete or a majority stag population
at steady state. It is observed that the tie-breaking strategy where the players choose
to not change their strategy when their is a tie, favors the stag population since the
stag population takes over the network with a smaller initial critical mass. As shown in
Figure 5.3, the final population rapidly converts to stag hunters as soon as there are a
little more than 60% stags in the initial population.

In terms of time taken to reach steady state, it is observed that when the network
is close to the critical mass for either players, it takes a few rounds before the steady
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Strategy/ Network
Majority
No Change
Random

Random
68%
65%
68%

Watts-Strogatz
68%
68%
68%

Table 5.1: Average Degree

Strategy/ Network
Majority
No Change
Random

Random
70%
70%
70%

Watts-Strogatz
75%
75%
75%

Table 5.2: Distinct Degree Averages

Strategy/ Network
Majority
No Change
Random

Random
65%
63%
65%

Watts-Strogatz
65%
63%
65%

Table 5.3: Average Edges

Strategy/ Network
Majority
No Change
Random

Random
65%
65%
65%

Watts-Strogatz
65%
65%
65%

Table 5.4: Median Average Degree
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Figure 5.3: Initial and final stag and hare population in Random and Watts-Strogatz
Networks with Average degree and no-change tie-breaking strategy
state is achieved. However, when the network starts with a critical population for either
strategy of players, the steady state is achieved in two rounds. As shown in Figure 5.4,
the Stag critical mass is 65% and the steady state is reached in two rounds. Similarly
Figure 5.4 shows that just below the critical mass, the network takes three rounds to
stabilize. Similar result is observed from Figure 5.5 in the Watts-Strogatz Network. It is
also interesting to see that in Watts-Strogatz Networks, the population of Stag hunters
when the initial population is 65% starts to fall. The overall population falls to below
40% in a single round. In the third round, the population rebounds and goes back to the
initial composition at steady state. This rebound shows that while certain clusters of the
population were converting to hare, others were becoming predominantly stag hunters. In
subsequent rounds, the predominantly stag clusters are able to convert some of the hare
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population back to stag. The Watts-Strogatz Network is in between random and regular.
While this rebound is seen in the Facebook but not in the Bárabasi-Albert Networks. It
is also absent in all other networks.

(a) Initial population of Stag 63%

(b) Initial population of Stag 65%

Figure 5.4: Evolution of strategies in populations in a Random Network with average
degree is 131

5.1.3

Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert Network

The Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert Networks are complex networks with several large
clusters of tightly coupled nodes. Clusters are connected to each other through few
connections. Due to the complex structure, these networks have the most interesting
paths to steady state. As shown in Figure 5.6, a much smaller critical mass of stags
is needed to convert the entire population into stag hunters. In addition, the Facebook
Network has a large transition period from 55% to 65% initial Stag population where
the population continues to have some hare hunters before the entire population converts
to Stag hunters. In addition, with 55% inital Stag population, the Stag population falls
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(b) Initial population of Stag 68%

Figure 5.5: Evolution of strategies in populations in a Watts-Strogatz Network with
average degree is 131
below 40% before it rebounds to more than 780% at steady state. This is attributed to
clustering effect seen in complex networks and the fact that clusters slowly change the
strategies of each other through the links they have between them. The Bárabasi-Albert
Network does not have this rebound phenomenon but Watts-Strogatz Network does as
seen earlier.

Following table summarizes the results in Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert Networks,
showing that these networks are statistically similar. Results indicate that starting with
lower percentage of Stags at Bárabasi-Albert Network than Random and Watts-Strogatz
Networks resulted the entire population to convert to Stags. It is enough to start with
63% of Stags for Majority, and 60% of Stags for No Change and Random tie-breaking
strategies.
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Figure 5.6: Initial and final stag and hare population in Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert
Networks with no-change tie-breaking strategy
Strategy/ Network
Majority
No Change
Random

Facebook
63%
60%
60%

Bárabasi-Albert
63%
60%
60%

Table 5.5: Comparison while 22 edges attached from a new node to existing nodes

5.1.4

Co-Existence of Both Strategies

In the Facebook nNetwork when the network ends up with more Stags than Hares,
both Stags and Hares can co-exist. Similarly in Grid and Torus Networks, there are
compositions where both Stag and Hare hunting strategy are present with Stag being
more in proportion than Hare. However, in Random, Watts-Strogatz and Bárabasi-Albert
Networks the Hares completely wipe out when the Stag population dominates. This is
ofcourse because of clustering effect. Dominant clusters of Stag and Hare population are
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(a) Initial population of Stag 55%
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(b) Initial population of Stag 65%

Figure 5.7: Evolution of strategies in populations in a Facebook Network
formed that resist change of strategy because neighbors with both strategies have the
same payoff and hence the opposing strategy is not lucrative enough to make the switch.
For example, as seen in Figure 5.7(a), there is a small population of Hare hunters that
persist in the final population even after several rounds of the game. Meanwhile, there
are networks where after a critical mass of Stag hunters, the entire population turns into
100% Stag hunters, showing that there is no transition region where both strategies can
potentially dominate.

This result reflects opinions in real-world. There are regions of population that have
a certain opinion about politics while there are others with opposite views. In Facebook
Network, the rebound or double crossover observed when the initial population if 55%
Stags can also be compared to delayed information or knowledge. Changes affecting one
part of the network might not immediately show in other parts immediately. For instance,
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(a) Initial population of Stag 55%
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(b) Initial population of Stag 60%

Figure 5.8: Evolution of strategies in populations in a Bárabasi-Albert Network
at time t1 an individual’s belief is A and he/she can get some additional information at
time t2 . The new knowledge may result in changes in beliefs at time t3 . It is possible
to observe more crossover in a larger network than in a smaller network. In addition,
networks with clusters connected only through few links exhibit this phenomenon more
commonly than tight-knit and random networks.

5.1.5

Time to Reach Steady State

It is interesting to observe that the time to reach steady states is longer for Facebook
networks while all other networks reach steady states within 2-3 rounds of the game.
Facebook networks can take as many as 12 rounds to reach the steady state at transitional
population sizes, where both strategies exist at steady state. This can again be attributed
to clusters and the delay in information traveling from one cluster to another.
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Figure 5.9: The Number of Rounds till to reach steady state on Facebook, Random and
Watts-Strogatz Networks with different parameters used

Figure 5.10: The Number of Rounds until to reach steady state on Facebook
and Bárabasi-Albert Networks when the parameter m=22
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In terms of real-world networks, changes that are happening in one part of the network
don’t flow to the other part of the network immediately. Information flows very fast
for uniform networks such as grid however, it is not as fast in physical and even social
networks. For example the 2019 corona-virus that started in November in one part of
the globe and it reached to US in March. If everything happens immediately there would
be no time for an action. If countries work together when an information is received it
would be possible for them to stop the spread of virus.

5.1.6

Earlier Conversion of Facebook Network to Stag Population

Facebook Network converts to Stags population at a threshold lower than the expected
value of payoffs. In Facebook Network, point of survival of Stags is significantly earlier
than the expected value.
Recall that the expected value when the Stag and Hare payoffs are equivalent, can be
computed as 4(x) + 0(1 − x) = 3(x) + 3(1 − x), where x is the fraction of the Stag
population and 1 − x is the fraction of the Hare population. Solving for x in this equation
3
gives x = . Thus, it is expected that the population should have 75% Stags in order to
4
convert the entire population into Stag hunters.

This is only possible again because there might be clusters of the population that might
reach a critical mass to convert into Stag Hunters. These clusters pass their influence to
neighboring clusters as the neighbors see higher payoff with Stag hunting strategy. This
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results in the population converting at a smaller critical mass. Results will be different if
each cluster is treated as its own network, and the initial population mix is set to a given
percentage for each cluster individually rather than the entire population.

5.2

Hawk-Dove Game

As discussed in the Chapter 3, the Hawk-Dove game is an adversarial game. Analytical
computation using the payoff matrix presented in Chapter 3, shows that the population
needs to have more than 50% Doves initially to convert the entire population into Doves.
However, empirical results show that the final composition of the population may not
convert entirely to Doves for some networks and in others the population might forever
fluctuate between Hawk and Dove strategies in alternate rounds of the game. The lack
of steady state in Hawk-Dove games is a result of the absence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Two players in the equilibrium state get unequal payoffs with Hawk being
the wining strategy and Dove the losing strategy. However Hawk player has no incentive
to switch to Dove because the Dove-Dove play leads to a lower payoff than Hawk-Dove.
However, the Dove player can observe a higher payoff for its Hawk neighbor. Unfortunately, when the Dove player switches to Hawk strategy, the payoffs of both players
playing Hawk now reduces to -1. Thus, both players may imitate a Dove neighbor in the
next round to play the Dove strategy for a higher payoff. This state of indecision can
continue indefinitely in some networks and initial conditions.
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Grid and Torus Networks

Grid and Torus Networks ends up having 55% of Hawk in average no matter what the
initial population percentage of the player is. Steady state is observed in Grid and Torus
Networks, with 55% Hawk and 45% Dove in the final population. It takes about 5 rounds
to reach this stable state. Figure 5.11 are sample for each networks and representation of
rest of the simulations for Grid and Torus Networks.

(a) Grid Network with initial population of Hawk (b) Torus Network with initial population of Dove
20%
70%

Figure 5.11: Evolution of strategies in populations in a Facebook Network

5.2.2

Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks

In Random Network existence of Hawk population depends on the initial population
of Hawk players. Results reveal that when the percentage of Hawks introduced to the
population is between 20% and 50% after the first round of game Hawks takes over the
population however Doves are still existing with a very small percentage as shown in
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Figure 5.12. Another interesting results which is obtained from the experiments that
starting between 78% and 90% of Hawk population, percentage of Doves goes as high
as around 90% and continue oscillating around 90%. Interestingly enough after having
initially 90% of Hawks, Doves population reduces and oscillates around 60%. This shows
that Doves can invade in a population of pure Hawk.

Figure 5.12: Random Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 30 percent

Figure 5.13: Random Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 88 percent

CHAPTER 5.

RESULTS: PAYOFF BASED STRATEGY UPDATE

86

It takes less than 10 rounds to reach a quasi steady state in Random Networks and
the oscillation of Hawks and Doves are not intersecting after 10 rounds of play. Finally with an initial composition of 55% of Hawks and 45% of Doves, i.e, right after the
threshold of 50%, the population fluctuates widely between almost 100% Hawks to 20%
Hawks(Figure 5.14). This shows that a small number of Doves in a predominantly Hawk
population can potentially upend the entire population dynamics to take down the Hawk
population.

Figure 5.14: Random Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 55 percent

Figure 5.15 shows the initial and final composition of Hawk population in Random Networks. There are two regions of instability where the Hawk and Dove population fluctuates by large amounts. The first region is from 50-60% of initial Hawk population and
the second is when there are more than 88% of Hawks in the initial population.
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Figure 5.15: Game is played in a Random Network and results show the initial Hawk
population vs. final Hawk population

Figure 5.16: Game is played in a Watts-Strogatz Network and results show the initial
Hawk population vs. final Hawk population
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The Hawk-Dove game on a Watts-Strogatz does not always reach a stable state. Results show that when the game starts with a small number of Hawks (less than 50%),
the final population can end up with Hawks only (Figure 5.17). On the contrary when
the population starts with 75%-90% of Hawks, the population converts to Dove players(Figure 5.18). This is a strange phenomenon because it shows that Dove players can
invade a Hawk population, turning it into Dove only and the same is true for Hawk population. Neither of the two population is stable at any point since introduction of just
a few players of the other kind can upend the entire population. Since Watts-Strogatz
Networks have more clusters than Random Networks, this phenomenon can be attributed
to clusters reacting to change locally and then spreading the change to the rest of the
population. In addition, the instability that was seen in Random Networks is not observed in Watts-Strogatz Networks. When the population switches to the opposite kind,
there is some fluctuation between rounds of the game but clearly one type of strategy is
always more dominant than the other. It was further noticed that Doves still exist in very
small amounts when the game begins with less than 50% of Hawks. However when the
starting population of Hawks is 50%, the Hawk population oscillates between 70% and
90% while Doves oscillates between 10% and 30%.
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Figure 5.17: Watts-Strogatz Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 40
percent

Figure 5.18: Watts-Strogatz Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 85
percent

Once the initial Hawk population increases to 75% dramatic drop of Hawks is observed
at the end of 100 rounds, only 5% of Hawks are left in the network. It is possible that
there exist multiple clusters consisting more than one Hawk. These totally disappear
or diminish to extremely few Hawks. The reason would be the interaction in between
Hawks in these clusters resulting in negative payoffs, while Doves payoff is zero when they
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interact with Hawks. Since Hawks observe Doves getting a higher payoff, they change
their strategy to Doves in these clusters. On the other hand, when the starting Hawk
population is increased to 95%, it is observed that Hawks survive and the population
fluctuates between 80% and 60% as shown in Figure 5.19. This might mean that 5% of
Dove population is not quite enough for Hawks to change their strategy.

Figure 5.19: Watts-Strogatz Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 95
percent

In general it takes longer to observe quasi stable states in Watts-Strogatz Network, most
of the time it takes more than 20 rounds of game.

5.2.3

Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert Network

When the Hawk-Dove game played on Facebook network the result is similar to Grid
and Torus Networks. Independent of starting Hawk population, the final popuation
reaches a quasi stable state with around 60% Hawk and 40% Doves in the population.
It is an interesting result for Facebook Network because one would expect to get similar
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results as Watts-Strogatz Network since Facebook is more akin to a complex network
with clusters. Analytical results for Hawk-Dove game shows that the fitness of Hawks
and Doves is around 50%. Experimental results in Facebook Network reach close to the
analytical results (Figure 5.20) regardless of the initial composition of the network.
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Figure 5.20: Facebook Network with initial fraction of Hawk population set at 40%, 50%
and 55%

Figure 5.21: Game is played in a Bárabasi-Albert Network and results show the initial
Hawk population vs. final Hawk population
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Hawk-Dove game played on Bárabasi-Albert Network with average connectivity 22
show that when there are 10% Hawks in the network, the populations of Hawks fluctuate
endlessly between 20% and 90% in alternate rounds. There are very few initial proportions of the population that lead to quasi stable states where the fluctuations of the two
strategies is non-overlapping. Figures 5.22 shows the overlapping fluctuations while Figure 5.23 shows the quasi steady state where the two strategies are clearly separated and
one strategy dominates the other at all times.

Figure 5.22: Bárabasi-Albert Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 20
percent

Figure 5.23: Bárabasi-Albert Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 30
percent
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Finally in Bárabasi-Albert Networks, no matter what percentage of Hawks or Doves
exists in the start population Hawks always end up to be atleast as many or more than
Doves in the final state.

5.2.4

Time to Reach Steady State

Absolute steady state for any networks haven’t observed for the Hawk-Dove game in
any network. The Grid and Torus Networks show the most stability but there are small
variations even in those networks. Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks reach stability
only in certain initial configurations when the initial proportion of Hawks is less than
50%. When they have a steady state, they reach stability immediately in just one round
of play. Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert Networks never have a stable steady state for
most configurations. In all networks, most configurations take a while to reach their
quasi steady states. In regular and Random Networks, atleast 6 rounds of play is needed
to reach the quasi stable state while in Facebook Network, there are as many as 20 rounds
before some stability is reached.

Finally, with the game setup in this study, optimal ratio of Hawks to Doves is 50:50;
however it is observed that this is not the case for Facebook Network. In Facebook
Network optimal ratio of Hawks to Doves is 60 to 40. Therefore, as the players fight for
resources, the population is slightly dominant in Hawk like behavior.
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Discussion

Figure 5.24: Initial population Percentage vs Final population percentage values for Stag
Hunt game in Random, Watts-Strogatz, Torus , Grid, Facebook and Bárabasi and Albert
Networks

Figure 5.25: Initial population Percentage vs Final population percentage values for Stag
Hunt game on Facebook and Bárabasi and Albert Network when the parameter m=22 is
used for Bárabasi and Albert Network
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Figure 5.26: Initial population Percentage vs Final population percentage values for Stag
Hunt game on Facebook, Random, Watts-Strogatz Networks when No-Changed Strategy
and Average Degree Parameters used on Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks

Results in this thesis shows similarities with Santos et. al [28]. In Santos et. al’s work
cooperation emerges when T>S where T is the temptation to defect payoff for defector
and S is the sucker payoff for the cooperator. This happens at the 75% while experiments
in this study show that it is 60% for Bárabasi and Albert graph. Which is significantly
lower than Santos et. al’s results.

In addition, similar results with Tomassini et. al [34] is observed which considered
the growing network that is dynamic network and evolution is based on cooperators and
defectors. In this thesis, instead of using dynamic networks, stable networks with evolving
strategies is used. Tomassini et. al experimented with payoffs of Hawk Dove game by
changing the gain-to-cost ratio during this study gain-to cost-ratio is used as 1/2. In
Tomassini et. al’s work on lattice, frequency of Doves is 50% when gain-to-cost ratio is
1/2 while in this this study it is 55% Doves.

Chapter 6
Results: Influence Based Strategy
Update
The primary purpose of this thesis is to study evolutionary dynamics of strategies
when influence in addition to payoff is used to determine the evolutionary dynamics. As
explained in Chapter 3, the payoff dynamics which is based on imitating the best payoff
in the neighborhood is combined with centrality measures of neighbors to decide the
strategy of each player in subsequent rounds of the game. Fermi like update rule based
on centrality measure is used and which computes the relative likelihood of a player to
change strategy in the next round. This likelihood or probability of switching strategies
depends on the relative centrality of the player against the most successful neighbor
i.e., the neighbor with the highest reward and ties are broken at random. Centrality of
players is calculated in terms of Degree Centrality, Betweenness Centrality and Closeness
Centrality which depend on the structural properties of the network and the position
of the player in the network. As in earlier experiments in this study, Stag Hunt and
Hawk Dove games are used to understand the effects of centrality measures in Grid,
97
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Torus, Random, Watts Strogatz, Barabasi Albert and Facebook Networks. To the best
knowledge this study is the first which combines the Fermi rule with centrality measures
to create a new evolutionary dynamics ad study the effect in various networks.

All results presented here are for 2 player games. In order to have a better understanding of evolution of the networks, games are played for 100 rounds and an average of 10
initial assignments of strategies is used for comparison.

6.1

Stag Hunt Game

Experimental results in Chapter 5 revealed the population switches to Stag hunting
even before the critical mass of 75% of Stags in the population, and it is also the case
when Fermi like update rule is used. When centrality based update rule is used in Stag
Hunt game co-existence of both strategies is observed in Bárabasi-Albert and Facebook
Networks as in the tie breaking strategy. Even though the time to reach steady state
while having double crossover in Facebook Network is taking longer, this is still the case
with Fermi like update rule. The following sections are providing detailed explanations
of centrality measures in Grid, Random, Watt-Strogatz,Bárabasi-Albert and Facebook
Networks follow by insightful results for Stag Hunt game.
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Figure 6.1: Figure above shows the initial Stags population in order to convert whole
population to Stags using Degree Centrality measure(on the left), Betweenness Centrality
measure( in the middle), Closeness Centrality measure (on the right)

6.1.1

Grid and Torus Networks

Figure 6.2: Centrality vs Degree Scatter plot of Grid Network

Before presenting the results, it is important to see how various centrality values are
distributed in Grid and Torus Networks.
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For Grid Network there are three kinds of nodes in terms of number of neighbors.
Corner nodes which have two neighbors, edge nodes which have three neighbors and
middle nodes which have 4 neighbors. Because of the regularity of the network, all corner
nodes have the same degree centraly, edge nodes have the same degree centrality and
middle nodes have the same degree centrality. However, the closeness and betweenness
centrality is higher for nodes closer to the center of the grid and gradually decreases as
the distance from the center increases.

Corner players can only play with the players who are located on the edge right next
to them. Both players have the same centrality. Therefore, if the corner player’s payoff is
less than his neighbor at the edge, probability of changing strategy of the corner player’s
is payoff dependent, which means corner player would choose to change his strategy to
the player with the highest payoff.

Players on the edges play the game with the players who are located on the corner,
at the edge or in the middle. If a player’s payoff is less than the neighbors, then the
probability of edge player’s changing strategy to middle player’s strategy is higher than
changing his strategy to another edge or corner player’s strategy when the neighbors
payoffs are all the same.

Lastly, non-edge or corner players can only play with the players located further in
the middle and the edge. When a middle player’s payoff is lower than the neighbors’,
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probability of player in the middle changing his strategy to players that are closer to the
middle is higher than changing to edge neighbor’s strategy when the payoffs are the same.

In a Torus Network, each player has the same degree centrality, same betweenness
centrality and same closeness centrality values. Torus Network is similar to the Grid
Network, however it doesn’t consist of any corner or edge players. Since Torus Network has
no corner or edge nodes, centrality difference of each node is zero. Therefore probability of
changing strategy to neighbors strategy when the payoff of a player is less than neighbors’
depends only on the payoff so results will not be any different from the previous results in
this study and therefore, the results for Torus Network will not be shown in this section.

Figure 6.3: Grid Network: Initial vs Final Stag population with and without Influence

Most important result with Grid Network is when initial Stags around 60% to 65%
with the influence based update rule Stags taking over the population (Figure 6.4). This
was not the case with the payoff based evolutionary dynamics where the Stag population
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grew linearly with the initial population, not reaching 100% until the initial composition
was higher than 90% (Figure 6.3). Thus, it is clear that influence changes the dynamics
of the Grid Network.

Figure 6.4: Grid Network while initial fraction of Stag population is 63 percent. On the
left Degree Centrality, in the middle Betweenness Centrality and on the right Closeness
Centrality is used in the probability function

6.1.2

Watts-Strogatz and Random Networks

Figure 6.5: Centrality vs Degree Scatter plot of Watts-Strogatz and Random Networks
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Comparison of centrality measure vs. degree of nodes for Watts-Strogatz and Random
Networks reveal similarities in their statistical distributions. This indicates that the
evolutionary dynamics of these networks should be similar as well. Influence based update
rule results support the prediction. When initially 65% of Stags are introduced to the
population, Stags almost completely take over the population in both Random and WattsStrogatz Networks.

Figure 6.6: Initial and final stag and hare population in Random and Watts-Strogatz
Networks with Betweenness Centrality and Centrality Based Strategy

Applying different centrality measures in the update rule doesn’t make much difference in terms of the critical mass of Stags needed to convert the entire population into
Stag hunters. Previously, by applying three types of tie breaking strategy update rules,
difference with regard to initial Stags introduced to the population to convert the whole
population to Stags was noticed, but this is not the case when the different centrality
measures used with Fermi like update rule.
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Figure 6.7: Random Network while initial fraction of Stag population is 65 percent when
Degree Centrality is used in the probability function

Figure 6.8: Watts-Strogatz Network while initial fraction of Stag population is 65 percent
when Closeness Centrality is used in the probability function
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Bárabasi-Albert and Facebook Networks

Figure 6.9: Centrality vs Degree Scatter plot of Bárabasi-Albert Network

In Bárabasi-Albert Network, nodes with lower degrees have lower centrality measures.
While the degree centrality of nodes are linear with degree of nodes, betweenness centrality
of nodes increases exponentially correlated. Closeness centrality increases logarithmically
with node degree. The closeness centrality is a short range from 0.7 to 1.

In the Bárabasi-Albert Network that is used in the experiments has only 50 nodes
which has 3500 neighbors which means that very few nodes have more neighbors than
the average. This indicates that more Stags will be needed in a Bárabasi-Albert Network
to influence the whole population. The empirical results with probability update rule
when closeness centrality is used corroborate this observation. Convergence to a Stags
population is observed with 68% of Stags when degree centrality is used, 60% of Stags with
betweenness centrality, and 70% of Stags with closeness centrality. Both graphs below

CHAPTER 6. RESULTS: INFLUENCE BASED STRATEGY UPDATE

106

represents the population when there is initially 60% of Stags, the first graph represents
the results when degree and closeness centrality used and the second graph represents the
result when betweenness centrality is used.

Figure 6.10: Bárabasi-Albert Network while initial fraction of Stag population is 60 percent when Degree and Closeness Centrality are used in the probability function

Figure 6.11: Bárabasi-Albert Network while initial fraction of Stag population is 60 percent when Betweenness Centrality is used in the probability function
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Figure 6.12: Centrality vs Degree Scatter plot of Facebook Network

As in Bárabasi-Albert Network there are very few number of nodes which have high
degree. Many nodes which have degree between 0 and 300 have betweenness centrality
measure close to zero and many nodes which have degree between 0 to 200 have closeness
centrality values clustered between 0.2 and 0.4 while degree centrality measure is linearly
correlated with the degree of a node.

In Facebook Network there are a few nodes which have very high betweenness centrality measures and a large number of nodes with similar betweenness. Most nodes
have low measures of betweenness centrality. Therefore, probability of switching to a
neighbor’s strategy is primarility payoff dependent. This means that initially more Stags
must be introduced in the population to convert the entire population to Stags. Figures 6.13 6.14 6.15 show visualization of the Facebook Network showing centrality mea-
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sure of nodes and their degrees. The centrality values is represented by the size of the
nodes and degree of nodes is represented by the color of the nodes [17].

Figure 6.13: Visualization of degree centrality in Facebook Network

Figure 6.14: Visualization of betweenness centrality in Facebook Network

Figure 6.15: Visualization of closeness centrality in Facebook Network
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With degree centrality measures 65% of Stags, with betweenness centrality measures 80%
of Stags and with closeness centrality measures 68% of Stags are needed in order to
convert the whole population to Stags. These percentages are much higher than in the
payoff based evolutionary dynamics presented in Chapter 5.

Figure 6.16: Facebook Network while initial fraction of Stag population is on the left 65
percent when Centrality measure is used, in the middle 80 percent when Betweenness
Centrality is used and on the right 68 percent when Closeness Centrality is used in the
probability function

6.1.4

Co-Existence of Both Strategies

Figure 6.17: Replicator Dynamics when there are 75% Stags to Start with in a perfect
graph with fitness calculation fA = axA + bxB , fB = cxA + dxB
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Previously, by using the replicator dynamics equation in a perfect network, it was noted
that the initial Stag population needs to be 75% for the population to convert into Stag
hunters at steady state.

Empirical results from the influence based evolutionary dynamics shows that with initial
start population of StagsAs low as 55%, both strategies an co-exist with more Stags than
Hare. In Bárabasi-Albert Network co-existence of both strategies with more Stags is also
seen if initially 58% Stags are in the population.

Figure 6.18: Initial Stag population is 58% with betweenness centrality in Bárabasi-Albert
Network
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Figure 6.19: Initial Stag population is 55% with betweenness centrality in Facebook
Network

Co-existence of both strategies with more Stags appears in all the networks with certain
initial population of Stags. However, in Facebook Network co-existence of both strategies
occurs for a wide range of initial population. In Facebook Network when initial Stag
percentage is between 55% to 68% coexistence of both strategies observed. In other
networks, this range is shorter such as only 63% to 68% for Bárabasi-Albert Network.

6.1.5

Time to Reach to Steady State

On Facebook Network results reveal that if the influence in the strategy update rule is
used, it takes more number of rounds for Stags to stabilize in the population than with the
payoff based evolutionary dynamics. Time to reach to steady state in Facebook Network
is even longer when closeness centrality is used as the influence variable. It takes about
40 rounds for Stags and Hares to reach to steady state.
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Figure 6.20: Initial Stag population is 50% with closeness centrality in Facebook Network

Another observation is the double crossover. As in the payoff based strategy update
rule, double crossover is observed with the Fermi like strategy update rule. It takes less
round of games between crossovers with the payoff based update rule than with Fermi
like update rule. Significantly more rounds of play takes to reach until second crossover
and Stags start stabilizing. This shows, when centrality measure is used, the decision of
higher influence players trickle down slowly to far away nodes. There is also resistance for
the change as nodes with similar influence but opposing strategies compete and prevent
the change to flow through them.

6.2

Hawk Dove Game

The state of indecision remains when Fermi like update rule is used with Hawk Dove
game. Experiments affirm some similar, and different results as in the payoff based
evolutionary dynamics. Quasi steady state is the major observation in these experiments
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when centrality measures are taken into consideration. Results for different centrality
measures in different networks are presented in this section for Hawk Dove game.

6.2.1

Grid Network

In Grid Network after few rounds of play close to 50:50 ratio of Hawks and Doves is
reached in the population with very small oscillation. Changing the centrality measure
to different measures, degree centrality, betweenness centrality or closeness centrality,
doesn’t affect the outcome of the game and slightly more Doves exist in the population
compared to Hawks.

Figure 6.21: Grid Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 50 percent and
Degree Centrality is used as an influence variable in the update rule

6.2.2

Random and Watts Strogatz Networks

In Random and Watts Strogatz Networks when the centrality is used in the calculation
of probability of changing strategies, even though the centrality measure values change,
almost identical behavior is observed. Both networks have the oscillating behavior no
matter what the initial Hawk percentage or the centrality measure which is used in the
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calculations. If at some point of the game Hawk to Dove Ratio is 70 to 30, next round of
the game Hawk to Dove ratio becomes 30 to 70 and this continues forever.

Figure 6.22: Random Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 60 percent.
On the left Degree Centrality , in the middle Betweenness Centrality and on the right
Closeness Centrality is used in the update rule

6.2.3

Bárabasi-Albert Network and Facebook Networks

In Barabasi Albert Network, when the degree centrality measures and closeness centrality measures of nodes used as an influence variable in the probability function, quasi
steady state is detected. Game starts with larger oscillation between Hawk and Dove in
subsequent rounds which steadies towards the end of 20 rounds. Eventually there are
60 to 40 Hawk to Dove ratio. However, there are still fluctuations indicating that the
network has a quasi steady state with strategies getting switched with every round of the
game.
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Figure 6.23: Bárabasi-Albert Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 60
percent on the left Degree Centrality is used and on the right Closeness Centrality is used
as an influence variable in the update rule

In Bárabasi-Albert Network when the betweenness centrality is used in the probability
function, coinciding oscillating behaviour observed with large Hawk to Dove ratio in each
round of the game as much as 80 to 20. This pattern is not effected by changing the
initial Hawk population. Doves are reaching as high as 70% on every other round of the
game.

Figure 6.24: Bárabasi-Albert Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 60
percent and the Closeness Centrality is used as an influence variable in the update rule
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Fluctuation of Hawks and Doves monitored in the Facebook Network. Pattern of the
oscillating behavior is very similar when the degree and closeness centrality measures are
used. As analyzed earlier this might happen because of the degree and closeness centrality
of the nodes have similar measures and this makes changing the strategy depends on payoff
as in earlier method with the tie breaking strategy. Hawks are always more than the Doves
and fluctuating around 60%.

Figure 6.25: Facebook Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 50 percent
on the left Degree Centrality is used and on the right Closeness Centrality is used as an
influence variable in the update rule

Pattern of fluctuation is little bit different when the betwennness centrality is used.
It takes a while for Hawks and Doves to change their behavior so this cause a slightly
different pattern. Even though the pattern changes it is still observed that Hawks are
usually more than the Doves in the population and Hawk to Dove ratio is around 60 to
40.
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Figure 6.26: Facebook Network while initial fraction of Hawk population is 50 and Betweenness Centrality is used as an influence variable in the update rule

Observations shows that Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks have very similar behavior when degree, betweenness and closeness centrality measures are used in the probability function. There are some similarities in Facebook and Bárabasi-Albert Networks
when degree centrality and closeness centrality measures used, however no comparison
can be drawn when betwenness centrality is used.

6.2.4

Time to Reach to Steady State

There was no absoulte steady state in any networks but close to steady state is noted
in some. In Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks there is no steady state but the other
networks have some quasi steady states.
In Grid Network almost steady state is reached after few rounds of game while it takes
longer for Bárabasi-Albert and Facebook Networks. Interestingly enough when the steady
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state occurs Dove population is more than the Hawks in Grid Network while it is opposite
for Bárabasi-Albert and Facebook Networks.

Chapter 7
Summary
In light of prior investigation of both payoff based and Influence Based evolutionary
dynamics, in this chapter both update rules are compared. In the first two sections, tie
breaking and influence based strategy update rules are further analyzed by comparing
the results for these two strategies for Stag Hunt and Hawk Dove games. Following the
first two sections thorough evaluation was performed in regard to future applications of
this study. This study is thus finalized by comments and conclusion in the last section.

7.1

Comparison of Two Dynamics with Stag Hunt
Game

Significant difference is observed in Grid and Torus Networks. In Grid and Torus
Networks when payoff based evolutionary dynamics is used there is no way to convert
whole population to Stags but it is not the case when the influence based update rule is
used. A convergence of Stags was detected as early as 60% of Stags introduced to the
initial population. This shows how centrality measures affect the game dynamics and
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foster cooperation.

Figure 7.1: Both graphs are starting with 63% Stags and on the left tie breaking strategy
and on the right influence based strategy used in Grid Network

There is not much difference in Watts-Strogatz and Random Networks when influence
based strategy update rule is used. In addition, different centrality values don’t change
the game dynamics significantly in these two networks except that slightly more Stags
are needed to reach cooperation in Watts-Strogatz and Random Networks.

Figure 7.2: On the left, graph of Random Network when initial population of Stags 63%
without influence and on the right Random Network when initial population of Stags 63%
with Degree Centrality measure
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Similar behavior is seen for the Bárabasi-Albert Network for both strategies. Only
difference is when degree and closeness centrality measures used, more Stags are necessary
for Stags to take over the population.

Figure 7.3: On the left, Bárabasi-Albert Network when initial population of Stags 60%
without influence and on the right Bárabasi-Albert Network when initial population of
Stags 60% with Closeness Centrality measure
Finally in Facebook Network in general initially more Stags are needed for Stags to take
over the population with the influence based evolutionary dynamics.

Figure 7.4: On the left, Facebook Network when initial population of Stags 60% without
influence and on the right Facebook Network when initial population of Stags 80% with
Betweenness Centrality measure
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Comparison of the Evolutionary Dynamics with
Hawk Dove Game

Significant difference is seen in Grid Network in terms of final population percentage
when the two different methods are used. Without the centrality measure ratio of Hawk
to Dove is 55 to 45 and with the Fermi like rule this is opposite and Hawk to Dove ratio
is 45 to 55 no matter what the initial Stag population is.

Figure 7.5: On the left, when initial population of Hawks 70% without influence and on
the right when initial population of Hawks 50% with Degree Centrality measure on Grid
Network

Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks have different types of oscillating behavior for
the two strategy update rules. One type of oscillating behavior is seen with the centrality
based update rule while it was not the case with the payoff based dynamics is used. On
the right, sample of Random Network with degree centrality is given and this behavior
for Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks doesn’t change even though the initial number
of Stags changes.
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Figure 7.6: On the left, Random Network when initial population of Hawks 60% without
influence and on the right Random Network when initial population of Hawks 60% with
Degree Centrality measure

Another network which is more consistent in terms of oscillating behavior is BárabasiAlbert Network. When closeness centrality is used oscillating behavior is similar to the
Random and Watts-Strogatz Networks and when degree and betweenness centrality is
used as an influence variable oscillating behavior is much similar to the Facebook Network.
This was not the case when only tie breaking strategy is used as a strategy update rule.
Facebook Network has also oscillating behavior for both strategy update rules. Hawks
and Doves are acting aggressively for the first rounds of the game when the tie breaking
strategy is used, then they start to settle down with a steady minimal fluctuation. On
the other hand; when Fermi like update rule is used, almost steady oscillating behavior
is noted throughout the 100 rounds of game.
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Figure 7.7: On the left, Facebook Network when initial population of Hawks 50% without
influence and on the right Facebook Network when initial population of Hawks 50% with
Degree Centrality measure

7.3

Application and Future Work

In addition to the simulations based on the payoff values which is given on Table 3.2,
experiments are done with different payoff values in Stag Hunt game. Experiments in this
study supports the Zollman’s findings [39]. In his paper ”Talking to Neighbors” Zollman
talked about the payoff difference in Stag Hunt game. He observed that when the payoff
difference between the Stag and Hare is lower it is much harder for Stags to survive in
the population and it is getting easier for Stags to change to Hare strategy.

7.3.1

Social Distancing Game

In a population, unexpected disease can spread immediately with uncontrolled actions.
Fast spreading diseases can be stopped or kept under control by necessary response. If a
disease is known and happened in the past there might be existing vaccine then individuals
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can be vaccinated in order to stop the spread. What if the disease is caused by an unknown
virus? What kind of preventive methods would be necessary to protect individuals? In
the case of a new disease vaccination might not be possible and formulating new vaccine
and testing it on enough number of entities takes longer. Therefore, in mean time best
action for individuals to isolate themselves or stay away from others, which is called
social distancing. Researchers worked on the diffusion of diseases for years and recent
pandemic brought it into our attention to examine with game theory to understand how
transmission happens. In this model two player game is used and strategies strategies
set as Infected and Not Infected. When the two Infected individuals meet they both get
zero payoff while the two Not Infected people meet their payoff changes depending on the
social distancing level (s) and when an Infected individual meets with a Not Infected one,
Infected get nothing while Not Infected get negative payoff. Below is the general payoff
matrix which is used in our simulations.
Infected
Not Infected

Infected
0, 0
-1,0

Not Infected
0, -1
s,s

Table 7.1: Payoff Matrix for Social Distancing Game which is used in simulations

In the game s depends on the social distancing level; if an individual completely isolated
from others s is going to have a large payoff value which is in this case s = 10, if there
is somewhat isolation and still some basic social activities takes place value of s = 5
and if an individual has a minimal social distancing s = 1. Total number of individuals
in the population is fixed and when an infected individual recovered it is assumed that
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the individual become Not Infected.For each s values which is talked about earlier the
game is played on Facebook Network for 100 rounds and the game is repeated for 20
times. Outcomes show us importance of social distancing in a population. If the social
distancing value s is greater it is observed that there is no way that whole population will
be Infected at any point. On the other hand if the value of s = 1 there is a possibility that
the Infected entities can take over the population and this can happen pretty quickly.

Figure 7.8: Fraction of Infected vs Not Infected Strategies for 100 rounds of game when
s = 10 on Facebook Network with 50% of Infected Strategy

More exploration can take place to explore more with these type of games to interpret
and design a game with different payoffs to mimic the real life scenarios. Another game
to explore would be inverse variation game.
Infected
Not Infected

Infected
0, 0
i,0

Not Infected
0,i
s,s

Table 7.2: Payoff Matrix for Inverse Variation Social Distancing Game
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In this type of social distancing game when the social distancing is high, i value can be
set to a lower number and when the social distancing is low, i value can be set to a higher
value. In a population not every infected individual meets with the not infected individual
and even an infected individual meets with not infected one it is possible that not infected
might not get infected. It is known that some people don’t get infected or even they get
infected they don’t get sick that much. Infected person can have different conditions,
such as; age, immunity, medical conditions. i can be a probabilistic value depending
on the condition of an individual who is not infected. Different negative payoffs can be
used based on who the individuals are or how healthy the individuals are. This is a
deterministic game but if there exists a probabilistic component and if the game is done
probabilistically the game results would be different.

By proposing this idea, insightful results may occur, however game dynamics must
be taken into consideration and deeper analysis of these types of games might require.
Strategy update rules which are introduced in this study can be explored more for the
different type of games.

7.4

Conclusion

In this thesis, the evolutionary dynamics in artificial and real social networks is studied.
The focus of this study is on the symmetric 2 x 2 games, Stag Hunt and Hawk Dove.
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Games are played on the real social network, Facebook and artificial networks, Grid,
Torus, Random, Watts-Strogatz and Bárabasi Albert to have a proper comparison. In
the first part of this paper tie breaking strategy is introduced and different tie breaking
strategies are used to explain the game dynamics on different types of networks. In the
second part of this paper starting Chapter 6, a new approach which is based on the Fermi
update rule is proposed. Identifying the most influential nodes and combining their payoffs
led us to have a probability calculation. This probability calculation is used in the game to
determine whether or not each player change their strategies. By conducting experiments,
an understanding is apparent thus drawing a comparison between the artificial networks
and the real network in turn establishing similarities of the networks.

One of the obvious observations which is encountered is how much centrality measure
is effective in Torus and Grid Networks and how those measures favor the highest payoff
strategy in a Stag Hunt game. Simulations reveal that more initial Stags necessary to
introduce to the population in order to reach steady state with the centrality base strategy
update rule. Another inspection is the time of convergence; it is very noticeable that
centrality affect the time of convergence.

In the Hawk Dove game,oscillating behavior is observed for both strategy update rules.
While fluctuation of strategies varies without Fermi like rule when the centrality is used,
a steady behavior is observed throughout the number of rounds independent of the initial
start population. In Torus and Grid Networks with a tie breaking strategy , the game
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favors the Hawks, while it is the opposite when the Fermi like rule is used. In Facebook
Network when the betweenness centrality is used it takes longer for players to change
their strategies. After analyzing the Facebook Network for two different strategies and
games, it can be conclude that, in general, in real networks, it takes a longer time for
that information to flow.
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